University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work

8-1999

Trait Anxiety as a Moderator of Problem
Structuring Effects on Solution Generation
Judith A. Wightman
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Wightman, Judith A., "Trait Anxiety as a Moderator of Problem Structuring Effects on Solution Generation" (1999). Student Work.
170.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/170

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

Trait Anxiety as a Moderator of
Problem Structuring Effects on Solution Generation

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Psychology
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Judith A. Wightman
August 1999

UMI Number: EP72820

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI'
Oi&swtaiien Publ *h*nq

UMI EP72820
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 134G
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

Thesis Acceptance

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree Master of Arts,
University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Committee

0" by

Chairperson

^J

Date

o ? /

( J ,Ay v

c J lBA P j

) ___
___

Trait Anxiety as a Moderator of
Problem Structuring Effects on Solution Generation
Judith A. Wlghtman, MA
University of Nebraska, 1999

Advisor: Lisa L. Scherer, Ph.D.

This study investigated the effects of problem structuring and anxiety on the
quantity and quality of solutions generated for ill-structured, complex problems.
Trait anxiety, the tendency to feel anxious across a wide variety of situations, has
been shown to impair problem solving performance in certain conditions. Trait
anxiety was examined as a possible moderator of the relationship between
problem structuring and solution generation. Participants were 184
undergraduate psychology students. Participants completed a trait anxiety
measure (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, 1983) and generated
solutions to an ill-structured problem, with varying levels of structuring (no
objectives, one-objective-at-a-time, conflicting objectives). The quantity and
resolving power of solutions generated was assessed by raters. Participants in
the one-objective-at-a-time condition generated more solutions than those in the
no objectives condition or the conflicting objectives condition, as predicted.
Contrary to hypothesis, trait anxiety did not moderate the relationship between
problem structuring and solution generation.
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1

Trait Anxiety as a Moderator of
Problem Structuring Effects on Solution Generation
Even the mild stress that arises when a decision maker anticipates slight
losses or uncertain risks may have discernible effects on the quality of
his search and appraisal activities. (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 49)
Problem solving and decision making are crucial skills needed by managers. On
a daily basis, managers are confronted with complex, multi-faceted problems
that require satisfactory resolution. Compounding the difficulty of this real-world
problem solving is the presence of multiple objectives, and the fact that satisfying
one objective often comes at the expense of neglecting others. One can readily
call to mind examples of managers who were more and less successful at this
problem solving task. There are many possible sources for these differences in
problem solving success. Characteristics of the situation, of the problem, and of
the problem solver may all be partly responsible for differences in the quantity
and quality of solutions generated to ill-structured problems. The present study
was designed to examine variables that may predict the problem solving success
of individuals when faced with ill-structured problems. Two independent variables
were examined for their effect on the quantity and quality of solutions generated;
trait anxiety and problem structuring.
Research on decision making has identified possible moderators of the
relationship between problem structuring and the quantity and quality of

2

solutions generated. Possible moderators include situational forces,
characteristics of the problem, and characteristics of the problem solver.
One characteristic of problem solvers that has been examined is level of
knowledge or experience in problem solving (Butler & Scherer, 1997). Another
possible moderator is trait anxiety. The distinction between state and trait anxiety
was first proposed by Cattell and Scheier (1960). State anxiety is a temporary
emotional state, while trait anxiety is a predisposition to feel state anxiety across
a wide variety of situations (Spielberger, 1972). Trait anxiety has been shown to
impair performance on a variety of cognitive and problem solving tasks (e.g.,
Montague, 1953). The cognitive tasks examined in prior research, however,
could all be classified as well-structured problems; a neglected area of research
is the effect of trait anxiety on the solution generation process for ill-structured
problems.
Problems can be classified by their level of structure. Well-structured
problems have known, fixed alternatives. The decision maker’s task is simply to
choose from among these alternatives (Abelson & Levi, 1985). Ill-structured
problems, in contrast, have unknown objectives and unknown alternative
choices. This type of complex problem is frequently encountered by individuals in
daily life. In order to find the best solution to ill-structured problems, individuals
can limit and organize the available information through structuring (Butler &
Scherer, 1997).
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One way to structure a problem is to consider objectives that one wants to
address. Pitz, Sachs, and Heerboth (1980) discussed the idea that giving a
problem solver objectives aids decision making by calling to mind certain
information from memory and limiting the interference of other information. Pitz
et al. found that giving participants one objective at a time led them to generate
more solutions than participants given no objectives or conflicting objectives. A
possible explanation for this result is that fewer constraints had to be satisfied for
a solution to be generated when only one objective was present; thus solution
generation in the one-objective-at-a-time condition was more prolific. Scherer
and Billings (1999) and Butler and Scherer (1997) examined the effects of
structuring not only on the quantity, but also on the quality of solutions
generated. They found that structuring the problem through the presentation of
objectives influences the quantity and resolving power of solutions.
The present study examined the role of trait anxiety as a moderator of the
effect of problem structuring on solution generation using a real-world problem.
This research is important because it has implications for managers who need to
be aware of their workers’ personality traits which may predispose employees to
impairments in problem solving. Finding that high trait anxious individuals suffer
impairments under certain structuring conditions would suggest that modifying
the problem solving situation, attempting to reduce the individual’s anxiety, or
both, would facilitate the generation of high quality solutions.
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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to discussion of problem
structuring, solution generation, and anxiety. First, an overview of problem
solving/decision making research will be presented, including models for how the
process works or should work. Next, research on problem structuring using
objectives will be reviewed. Then, a discussion of research on anxiety and its
effect on cognitive task and problem solving performance will point out the need
for research on trait anxiety and ill-structured problem solving. Finally, the
present study will be discussed as an investigation of the role of trait anxiety in
the problem structuring/solution generation relationship.
Models of Problem Solving/Decision Making
Many researchers have attempted to outline the stages that are involved
in the process of problem solving/decision making. Several models have been
proposed (e.g., Abelson & Levi, 1985; Bazerman, 1986; Kepner & Tregoe,
1965). There is no widely agreed-upon model, but several possibilities will be
discussed here. These models generally involve the use of “steps” that people
adhere to or should adhere to in order to make the best choice. The discussion
will begin with prescriptive models; that is, what steps decision makers should
follow. Then descriptive models, describing what decision makers actually do,
will be discussed. The bulk of this discussion will center on Abelson and Levi’s
model of decision making.
One prescriptive model of problem solving/decision making is that of
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Kepner and Tregoe (1965). In their model, problem solving involves seven
phases. The first is to establish objectives. Objectives outline what the decision
maker is trying to accomplish, and they lay the groundwork for the decision
making process. According to Kepner and Tregoe, objectives should be specific
and should describe the goal precisely. For example, if a manager has to solve a
problem regarding profit decreases, an objective might be to “increase profit 10%
by the next accounting year." The second phase is to classify objectives
according to importance. The third phase is to generate alternatives. Kepner and
Tregoe suggest examining each objective by itself and analyzing what
alternatives would satisfy that objective. The fourth phase is to evaluate
alternatives against the objectives to make a choice. The individual can use a
numerical scale for this, and rank each alternative according to each objective.
Fifth, the decision maker should choose the best alternative tentatively, with
“best” being defined as the alternative with the highest weighted score. The sixth
phase is to assess possible adverse consequences from the choice, and finally,
to control effects of the final decision. The model proposed by Kepner and
Tregoe is a prescriptive model which discusses what managers should do when
they are presented with a problem.
Another prescriptive model was offered by Bazerman (1986). Bazerman
outlined six steps in a rational decision-making process. The first is to define the
problem, the second is to identify the criteria, the third is to weight the criteria,
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the fourth is to generate alternatives, the fifth is to rate each alternative on each
criteria, and the last is to compute the optimal decision. The last step refers to a
process of multiplying several variables to find an expected value for each
alternative. The alternative with the highest expected value is then chosen. This
model assumes that people have the cognitive resources and are willing to
expend the effort to follow an orderly series of steps and to apply complicated
judgements to their decision making tasks. Bazerman’s model indicates what
people should do when making a decision, not what they actually do.
The previous models have in common their assumption that decision
makers are cognitive “spenders”; that is, that they are willing and able to exert
cognitive energy towards applying complex formulas to the problem solving task.
These models seem to apply only to well-defined decision problems. The
discussion will now turn to research on ill-defined decision problems.
In their classic review of decision making research, Abelson and Levi
(1985) made an important distinction between well-defined and ill-defined
decision problems. A well-defined problem is characterized by fixed alternatives
from which one must choose. The objectives and their probability of occurring
are known. An example of a well-defined problem is choosing from among
various automobiles to purchase. Ill-defined problems, in contrast, are
characterized by uncertainty. Luce and Raiffa (1957, as cited in Abelson & Levi,
1985) defined uncertainty as “the inability to assign specific probabilities to
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outcomes.” In solving an ill-defined problem, a decision maker may try to reduce
this uncertainty, thus turning the problem into a well-defined one. Several
methods can be used to reduce decision uncertainty.
Abelson and Levi (1985) outlined a phase theorem which describes the
process one follows in solving an ill-defined problem. The stages are as follows:
(1) problem recognition, (2) identification of alternatives, (3) evaluation of
alternatives, and (4) selection of an alternative. Each of these stages will now be
discussed in detail.
The first stage in Abelson and Levi’s (1985) phase theorem is problem
recognition. A problem is said to exist when there is a perceived discrepancy
between an actual state and a desired state. The problem must be sufficiently
arousing to motivate the individual to act, and the individual must also perceive
that he/she has the necessary ability to come to a satisfactory resolution.
Abelson and Levi pointed out that there is very little research on this phase of
problem solving, and attributed this neglect to the fact that the problem
recognition stage is simply taken for granted.
The second stage in Abelson and Levi’s (1985) model is identification of
alternatives. The first step in identifying alternatives is often structuring the
problem (Abelson & Levi, 1985; von Winterfeldt, 1980). Structuring involves
identifying properties, outlining the decision context, and generating alternatives
(Butler & Scherer, 1997). According to von Winterfeldt (1980), problem
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structuring is probably the most important part of decision analysis. He discussed
the structuring process in terms of three phases: (a) identifying the problem, (b)
developing an overall structure, and (c) refining the problem elements and
relations.
The stage of problem structuring is the focus of this investigation; thus,
research on problem structuring will be considered in depth. Problem structuring
research is in its infancy and only three studies have been conducted to
empirically examine this process. These three studies will be considered at
length.
The first study to systematically manipulate problem structuring was that
of Pitz et al. (1980). These researchers discussed the lack of problem structuring
research as troublesome because of the tendency for problem solvers to omit
important elements at this stage. A decision maker can become fixated on
certain aspects of the problem, leading to a discounting of other important
aspects. Another possible error at this stage occurs when schemata are evoked
by the problem. Once certain schemata are evoked, it may be difficult for the
problem solver to deviate and develop new ways of thinking about the problem.
The goal of the researchers was to examine structuring as a way to improve
decision quality by insuring that all relevant alternatives were considered. As
Scherer and Billings (1999) noted, the researchers seemed to equate solution
quantity with quality, and assumed that the best way to increase the quality of
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the ultimate decision would be to insure that all possible relevant alternatives
were generated.
Pitz et al. (1980) asked participants to generate alternative solutions to
personal choice dilemmas, such as a dilemma regarding what to do about a
roommate who uses marijuana. Participants were encouraged to list all
alternatives that might be relevant; however, the responses were then scored on
the basis of how sensible they were. Points were given for generating solutions,
but points were taken away for unrealistic solutions. As noted by Scherer and
Billings (1999), this may have constrained the participants’ generation of
alternatives.
Seven conditions were used in the Pitz et al. (1980) study. They were
derived from three kinds of treatments: categorization, objectives, and controls.
The categorization category involved two treatments in which participants were
presented with examples of solutions arranged in either a hierarchical form by
the objectives each satisfied, or an unorganized form. The purpose of this
treatment was to see if the structuring of example alternatives led participants to
generate more alternatives. The second treatment was the manipulation of
objectives. Eight objectives were generated by the experimenters and their
presentation to the participants was varied. Participants were assigned to the
following objective conditions: all eight objectives simultaneously, one objective
at a time, or two objectives at a time. Finally, two control groups were used. In

10

one control condition, participants were told that objectives are an important
consideration, but were not given any objectives to consider. The second control
group received no special instructions.
The dependent variable in the Pitz et al. (1980) study was quantity of
solutions generated. This variable was assessed by first creating a list of all
alternatives generated by all participants. These alternatives were organized into
broad categorizes, excluding ones that were too similar to distinguish or that
were frivolous. The number of alternatives generated that appeared in the list
were then counted for each participant. Pitz et al. found that only the oneobjective-at-a-time condition differed from the others. Participants generated
significantly more alternatives in this condition than in the other conditions. Posthoc analyses of the novelty of alternatives generated were conducted to
determine whether the extra responses in the one-objective-at-a-time condition
were more unusual than alternatives generated in the other conditions. This
variable was assessed by calculating the average relative frequency for each
alternative a participant generated. When analyzed as a covariate, no
differences were found for the novelty variable. This means that participants who
generated a large quantity of solutions did not necessarily generate more
unusual or novel solutions.
Pitz et al. (1980) offered two possible explanations for their findings. One
possibility was attributed to Gettys, in personal communication with the first
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author. Gettys suggested that the presentation of one objective at a time leads
decision makers to feel fewer constraints in their generation of alternatives. The
idea is that when only one objective Is present, the decision maker is less
constrained in his/her attempt to generate solutions that satisfy that objective.
The more objectives that are presented, the more constraints there are in
alternative generation. The other possible explanation is that the one-objectiveat-a-time condition leads to a more thorough cognitive search than the other
conditions. The researchers concluded with the prescription that decision makers
should attempt to consider alternatives not previously considered, and that this
should increase decision quality.
Scherer and Billings (1999) pointed out several limitations of the Pitz et al.
(1980) study. One of these is the assumption that the best way to increase
decision quality is to insure that the decision maker generates a large number of
alternatives. Scherer and Billings hypothesized that different results of structuring
would be obtained for quantity and quality, and that an increase in one did not
necessarily correspond to an increase in the other. Another limitation of the Pitz
et al. study was the instruction given to only list sensible alternatives. Scherer
and Billings instead supplied brainstorming instructions, so that participants
would not be restrained in their generation of alternatives. Scherer and Billings
examined the effect of various structuring techniques on the quantity and
resolving power of solutions generated. They used two of the problems from the
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Pitz et al. study; one about a college student whose roommate smokes
marijuana, and the other about a research assistant who is unhappy with her
assigned project.
Scherer and Billings (1999) manipulated problem structuring through the
presentation of objectives. The objective conditions were as follows: (a) one
objective at a time, (b) two conflicting objectives at a time, (c) two congruent
objectives at a time, and (d) no objectives. The. dependent variables were
quantity and resolving power of solutions generated. Two measures of quantity
were considered; the number of non-repeating alternatives and the number of
different categories represented by the alternatives. Resolving power was
defined as the degree to which a solution addresses conflicting aspects of the
problem (Upshaw, 1975). It was operationalized both as the average resolving
power of all alternatives generated by each participant, as well as the number of
highly resolving solutions (those rated 5 through 8 on an 8-point scale)
generated by each participant.
Scherer and Billings (1999) hypothesized that the one-objective-at-a-time
condition would lead to the generation of the greatest number of alternatives,
followed by the congruent objectives condition, the conflicting objectives
condition, and the no objectives condition. The second major hypothesis was
that the conflicting objectives condition would result in solutions with higher
resolving power than the other three conditions. The final hypothesis was that
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quantity and resolving power would be negatively correlated.
Participants in the Scherer and Billings (1999) study generated solutions
to a pre-test problem and two test problems. Analysis of covariance was applied
to the results with the quantity and resolving power of solutions generated to the
pre-test problem serving as the covariate. Pilot research was conducted to
determine which of the problems used in the Pitz et al. (1980) study could be
applied to the Scherer and Billings study. Only the marijuana problem and the
research problem yielded a set of four objectives that could be matched to form
congruent and conflicting pairs. Thus, these two problems were used as the
problems in the main experiment.
In the Scherer and Billings (1999) study, participants were instructed to
generate all the alternatives they could think of. The effort each individual
expended, as measured by time spent generating solutions, was kept constant.
Each participant was constrained to think about the problem for 20 minutes. In
the one-objective-at-a-time condition, participants were instructed to turn each of
the four pages at 5-minute intervals. In the conditions where four objectives were
presented in pairs, participants were given 10 minutes for each set of objectives.
Finally, in the no objectives condition, participants spent the entire 20 minutes
thinking about the problem and generating solutions with no objectives. It is
important to note that the presentation of objectives merely made the essential
conflict of the problem salient. Participants were not told to only list alternatives
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that satisfied the objectives presented. Problem structuring through the use of
objectives simply highlights the essential conflict of the problem.
The hypothesis regarding solution quantity was strongly supported.
Participants generated more solutions and more categories of solutions in the
one-objective-at-a-time condition than in the no objectives or conflicting
objectives conditions. The no objectives condition resulted in the fewest
alternatives being generated. This finding suggests that any objective
presentation is better than no objectives in increasing the number of alternatives
generated.
For solution resolving power, the results were complicated by a three-way
interaction between structuring, problem, and presentation order. Results were
more supportive of the predictions for the research problem than for the
marijuana problem, and also for resolving power operationalized as the number
of resolving solutions than for the average resolving power of solutions. For
average resolving power, significant main effects were found for the research
problem regardless of the order in which it was presented. The average resolving
power in the conflicting objectives condition was significantly higher than that in
the one-objective-at-a-time condition, as predicted. The average resolving power
in the no objectives condition was also significantly higher than in the oneobjective-at-a-time condition. In addition, the research problem produced a set of
alternatives of higher average resolving power (M = 4.48) than the marijuana
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problem (M = 3.79).
For resolving power operationalized as the quantity of resolving
alternatives (those rated five through eight), a significant interaction between
structuring and order of problem presentation was obtained. When the marijuana
problem was presented first, no significant differences were obtained for quantity
of resolving alternatives by structuring condition. When the research problem
was presented first, however, the conflicting objectives condition resulted in more
resolving alternatives than any of the other conditions, as predicted. In addition,
the congruent objectives and one-objective-at-a-time conditions resulted in more
highly resolving alternatives than the no objectives condition. Similar to results
obtained for average resolving power, a greater number of resolving alternatives
was generated for the research problem

(M =

3.96) than the marijuana problem

(M = 2.67).
Moderate support was obtained for the third hypothesis, that of an inverse
relationship between quantity and resolving power of alternatives. The oneobjective-at-a-time condition resulted in more alternatives than the conflicting
objectives condition, but fewer highly resolving alternatives and alternatives with
lower average resolving power. There was a significant, negative correlation
between the quantity of non-repeating alternatives and the average resolving
power of alternatives, as predicted. However, the correlation between the
quantity of non-repeating alternatives and the quantity of resolving alternatives
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was not negative as predicted, but positive.
Scherer and Billings (1999) concluded that problem structuring through
the use of objectives does influence the way a decision maker generates
solutions, in terms of both solution quantity and quality. In discussing their
results, Scherer and Billings noted that the alternatives generated for the
marijuana problem had overtones of emotionality, and that this emotionality may
have restricted participants’ ability or willingness to pay attention to structuring.
For emotionally involving problems, decision makers may be more likely to “take
sides” rather than examine the various aspects of the problem. The research
problem, with its lower emotional involvement, may have led participants to be
more objective and receptive to information in the problem, thus leading them to
generate more highly resolving alternatives. Another possible influence offered
by Scherer to explain the complex pattern of results was a moderator such as
familiarity with the problem. Familiarity could play a role through determining
which scripts are activated. If the problem is very familiar, the decision maker
may simply follow a script that was useful for previous instances, and disregard
the problem structure.
Several important points can be made about this study. First, it separated
the influence of structuring on the two independent variables of solution quantity
and resolving power of solutions. Second, it raised the possibility that some other
variables may be moderating the relationship between structuring and solution
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generation. Familiarity with the problem and emotionality aroused by the problem
were suggested as possible moderators. Finally, this study was the first test of a
structuring manipulation on solution generation with instructions to participants
that maximized their reporting of alternatives.
Butler and Scherer (1997) conducted a third examination of problem
structuring through objectives. In addition, they examined the effect of a
moderator variable, that of expertise. The variables examined were problem
structuring through objectives, expertise, and order of problem presentation. The
dependent variables were the quantity and quality of solutions, with quality
defined as the resolving power of the solutions. Resolving power was calculated
three ways: as a proportion of alternatives that received a three or higher (out of
six) on a resolving power scale, as the number of alternatives rated three or
higher, and as the highest rating given to that set of alternatives.
In the Butler and Scherer (1997) study, experts and novices generated
alternatives to two problems; one about a female lawyer experiencing sexual
harassment (Carol’s problem), and another about an organization facing
competition for its engineers (Acme’s problem). The expert group consisted of 57
graduate business students, and the novice group consisted of 72
undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses. Participants were given
either one objective at a time, two conflicting objectives simultaneously, or no
objectives. All participants generated solutions to both problems, with the order
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of problem presentation varied. It was predicted that experts would diverge from
novices in both the quantity and quality of their solutions. Specifically, experts
were predicted to generate fewer alternatives, but more resolving alternatives,
than novices. The conflicting objectives condition was expected to elicit solutions
with higher resolving power than the one-objective-at-a-time condition. Finally,
the one-objective-at-a-time condition was expected to elicit more solutions than
the conflicting objectives condition.
Replicating the results of the Pitz et al., (1980) and Scherer and Billings
(1999) studies, participants in the one-objective-at-a-time condition generated
significantly more alternatives than those in the conflicting objectives condition.
Contrary to prediction, experts generated more alternatives than did novices.
Results for quality of solutions varied depending on the operationalization of
resolving power. For number of resolving alternatives, the effects of structuring
and expertise were complicated by a significant two-way interaction between
expertise and problem, and a significant three-way interaction between
expertise, problem, and problem order. Follow-up comparisons indicated that for
the Acme problem, participants who received one objective at a time generated a
larger number of resolving alternatives than those who received no objectives.
Consistent with predictions, experts generated significantly more resolving
solutions than did novices, for both problems.
For resolving power calculated as the proportion of resolving alternatives,
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a significant interaction was found between objectives, problem, and problem
order. Post hoc comparisons revealed one significant difference: The Acme
problem elicited a greater proportion of resolving alternatives in the oneobjective-at-a-time condition versus the no objectives condition, when it was
presented second. Finally, for resolving power calculated as the highest
resolving solution, no significant main effects or interactions were found.
Further analysis by Butler and Scherer (1997) of the problem and order
effects revealed that participants generated significantly more resolving
solutions, and had a higher rated top alternative, for the Acme problem than the
Carol problem. Previous research had found the Carol problem to elicit more
feelings of emotional involvement than the Acme problem. Thus, Butler and
Scherer had expected higher quality solutions to be generated for the Acme
problem than for the Carol problem. In addition, participants who received the
Acme problem first generated fewer resolving solutions than those who received
the Carol problem first. For all three operationalizations of resolving power,
experts generated more resolving alternatives for the Acme problem than the
Carol problem.
To summarize the results of Butler and Scherer (1997) relevant to the
present study, the presentation of one objective at a time generally led to a
larger number of alternatives being generated than the presentation of two
conflicting objectives or no objectives. Presenting one objective at a time led to
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the generation of alternatives with higher resolving power as compared to no
objectives. The conflicting objectives condition elicited more resolving
alternatives than the no objectives condition, although this effect did not reach
significance.
The results obtained by Butler and Scherer (1997) for the effect of
structuring on quality differ somewhat from those obtained by Scherer and
Billings (1999). Recall that Scherer and Billings found the conflicting objectives
condition to elicit more resolving alternatives generally than the other conditions.
In the Butler and Scherer study, different problems were used and the effects of
structuring were complicated by an interaction between objectives, problem, and
problem order. This interaction may indicate that characteristics of the problem
may influence the effects of structuring on solution generation. One potentially
important difference between the Scherer and Billings study and the Butler and
Scherer study is that the former used problems about students, and the
participants probably had experience with similar problems. The Butler and
Scherer study deliberately used problems to which students would be unlikely to
relate. An acceptable conclusion seems to be that structuring influences the
quality of solutions to a greater extent for non-emotionally involving problems
than for emotionally involving problems.
Only three studies have examined the effect of structuring through the
presentation of objectives on the quantity and quality of solutions generated to ill-
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structured problems. One conclusive finding has been that the way a problem is
structured has important implications for the quantity and quality of solutions
generated (Butler & Scherer, 1997; Pitz et al., 1980; Scherer & Billings, 1999).
Presenting one objective at a time leads problem solvers to generate more
alternatives than presenting them with conflicting objectives or no objectives. But
these solutions, although numerous, are not necessarily of high quality. Quality
has been shown to be affected by the structuring method applied (Butler &
Scherer, 1997; Scherer & Billings, 1999), by the particular problem for which
alternatives are generated and the order of problem presentation (Butler &
Scherer, 1997; Scherer & Billings, 1999), and by expert status in the domain of
problem solving (Butler & Scherer, 1997).
Returning to the discussion of Abelson and Levi’s (1985) phase theorem
for decision making, Abelson and Levi outlined two different methods for
developing a structure for a problem. The first method is structuring by matching.
This technique is likely to be used when the problem solver has lots of
experience or expertise in the domain of the problem. In this method, the
problem is assigned to a category based on experience with similar problems.
This assignment to a category enables the individual to reduce the uncertainty
present in an ill-structured problem but does not necessarily insure that the
optimal solution will be reached. The technique may lead the problem solver to
neglect information unique to this particular situation.
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The second method for structuring a problem is structuring by hypothesis
generation. This method is typically used by decision makers with little
knowledge or expertise in the area. It involves generating hypotheses about how
and why the decision problem arose. This process was discussed by Gettys and
Fisher (1979; as cited in Abelson & Levi, 1985) as one in which memory
searches are used to generate hypotheses. Problem structuring is an important
area of the problem solving process to consider, for the requirements and
phases involved in well-structured and ill-structured problem solving may differ
substantially. According to Pitz et al. (1980), “When problems are less well
defined, there are serious obstacles to be overcome before a decision analysis
can be used” (p. 396).
After structuring the problem, the decision maker has to identify
alternative actions. Abelson and Levi (1985) point out the importance of framing,
or what they call diagnosis, to this process of generating alternatives. For
example, a manager’s diagnosis of a productivity problem as being due to the
laziness of his/her current staff implies a different set of actions than a diagnosis
of incompetent management. According to Abelson and Levi, diagnoses can
advance or inhibit the alternatives that are generated.
The third stage in Abelson and Levi’s (1985) model is evaluation of
alternatives. The overriding theme in this stage seems to be that people are
limited in their cognitive processing capacity. When evaluating alternatives,
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people's preferences are often ambiguous and variable, but the overall goal of
the evaluation process is to reduce uncertainty inherent in an ill-structured
problem. This evaluation of alternatives may involve strategies such as
predicting how likely various outcomes are or predicting the ways in which these
outcomes will affect one’s goals, and drawing a conclusion or “best guess” about
how likely various outcomes are.
Finally, the fourth stage in Abelson and Levi’s (1985) model is selection of
an alternative. This stage may involve emotions such as stress, disappointment,
and regret. Abelson and Levi stressed that the phase model is a convenient way
to capture the decision making process, but that problem solvers often do not
follow an orderly sequence in their efforts and may cycle back to earlier stages in
the model.
As was noted earlier, there is no single agreed-upon model for the illstructured problem solving process. However, variations on the basic form of the
model just discussed are quite common in the literature. As concluded by
Abelson and Levi: “These phases correspond more or less to the modal pattern
used by most decision theorists as a framework to organize research on illdefined decision problems” (p. 277).
In a descriptive study of problem solving effectiveness and individual
differences, Heppner, Hibel, Neal, Weinstein, and Rabinowitz (1982) identified
several differences between traditionally “effective” and “ineffective” problem
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solvers. The goal of the study was to extend the knowledge of variables affecting
the real-life problem solving process. Heppner et al. used the Problem Solving
Inventory (FSI; Heppner & Petersen, 1982), a self-report measure of personal
problem solving behavior and attitudes, to identify successful and unsuccessful
problem solvers. They then conducted structured interviews with the 20 highest
and 20 lowest scorers on the PSI about their cognitive, behavioral, and affective
reactions to interpersonal and intrapersonal problems. After the interview,
participants completed the Mooney Problem Checklist, which asks respondents
to report instances of problems falling into various categories such as finances,
adjustment to college work, and social-psychological relations.
Heppner et al. (1982) found a variety of differences between successful
and unsuccessful solvers of real-life problems. Specifically, participants who
perceived themselves in ways consistent with effective problem solving rated
themselves as being more systematic in problem solving, less impulsive and less
avoidant, and reported having clearer understanding of problems. Effective
problem solvers also were more motivated to solve problems, expected a more
positive outcome of problem solving, and were more likely to brainstorm, than
ineffective problem solvers. The authors noted the limitation of correlational
research, and pointed out the need for further research on the relationship
between self-reported problem solving effectiveness and objective analysis of
problem solving skill with real-world problems.
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The Heppner et al. (1982) study provides a foundation for the examination
of trait anxiety as a possible moderator of the relationship between problem
structuring and solution generation. Heppner et al. discovered that many
differences exist between those who perceive themselves as effective or
ineffective problem solvers. As will be discussed in the following section, level of
trait anxiety may be one of these differences.
The focus of the chapter will now turn to anxiety. The first issues to be
discussed include theories of anxiety and differences between anxiety and other
constructs. Next, literature examining the effects of anxiety on various tasks will
be presented. The chapter concludes with a summary of relevant research, and
outlines the present investigation of the effect of trait anxiety on the relationship
between problem structuring and solution generation.
Anxiety as a Construct
Anxiety is one of the most prevalent emotions discussed in psychological
literature and theory. Every normal human experiences anxiety in his/her lifetime,
and many on a daily basis. Anxiety can be beneficial or detrimental to
performance, depending on factors related to the individual, the task, and the
situation. The present section of the chapter will review several definitions of
anxiety, and outline the one adopted for this investigation.
Many definitions of anxiety have been proposed, but there is no single
agreed-upon definition. Theorists typically focus on either the physiological
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aspects of anxiety or on the psychological elements. One definition of anxiety
that incorporates both components was developed by Spielberger (1983).
According to Spielberger, anxiety refers both to an unpleasant emotional state,
and to a relatively stable personality trait. He described state anxiety as being
characterized by “subjective feelings of tension, apprehension, nervousness, and
worry, and by activation or arousal of the autonomic nervous system”
(Spielberger, 1983, p. 4). The distinction between anxiety as a temporary
subjective state and anxiety as a personality trait is central to his Trait-State
Anxiety Theory, (Spielberger, 1972) to be discussed later in the chapter.
A second definition to be considered is the one adopted in the current
investigation. Janis and Mann (1977) outlined the effects of stress that can result
from dealing with certain kinds of decisional conflicts. Later in the chapter, the
differences between stress and anxiety will be considered. Despite Janis and
Mann’s use of the term “stress” rather than “anxiety”, their definition will be
adopted because it seems to overlap more with common definitions of anxiety
than of stress.
According to Janis and Mann (1977), “psychological stress” refers to a
negative emotional state evoked by environmental incidents or stimuli which the
individual perceives as threatening. They elaborated on this definition, stating,
A ‘stressful’ event is any change in the environment that typically induces
a high degree of unpleasant emotion (such as anxiety, guilt, or shame),
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and affects normal patterns of information processing, (p. 50)
This definition was adopted as a definition of anxiety because it focuses on the
psychological and cognitive processing components of anxiety.
Attempts have been made to distinguish anxiety from the similar
constructs of fear, stress, and worry. Many examples can be found in the
literature of researchers using the three terms interchangeably, although different
processes seem to be involved in each. Although the affective states of fear,
stress, worry, and anxiety may share certain characteristics, distinctions will be
attempted for the sake of clarity.
Anxiety versus fear. The first distinction to be made is between anxiety
and fear. A common distinction made by researchers between anxiety and fear
lies in the source of the emotion. Anxiety is defined as having a largely unknown
or unrecognized cause, while the source of fear tends to be consciously
recognized. Spielberger (1976) agreed with this conception, and added that the
amount of fear a person feels is generally in proportion to how much objective
danger is present, while the magnitude of anxiety can reach far beyond the level
warranted by the situation. Levitt (1980), and Lazarus (1966), took a different
position, stating that fear and anxiety are interchangeable terms. Despite having
perhaps slightly different shades of meaning, Levitt claimed that it is not
meaningful to distinguish the two. In the anxiety literature, researchers often use
the two terms interchangeably.
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Anxiety versus stress. Stress is another term that tends to be used
interchangeably with anxiety in the literature. A problem that arises when
attempting to distinguish between stress and anxiety is the fact that there is no
agreed-upon definition of either construct. Many different definitions of stress
have been advocated by researchers, with definitions focusing variously on the
situation, the reactions by the individual, or the state of the individual.
Spielberger (1972) outlined a process that relates stress, threat, and anxiety. He
asserted that stress refers to the objective properties of a situation. Cognitive
appraisal is the next step; if a person perceives a situation as stressful, he/she is
said to be feeling threat. Spielberger used the term state anxiety to refer to the
result of this perceived threat.
Lazarus (1966) distinguished between physiological stress and
psychological stress. One difference between the two is that physiological stress
is a response to damage already incurred, while psychological stress refers to a
feeling of impending harm indicated by signals in the environment. According to
Lazarus, stress involves three classes of variables: (a) stimuli or situations that
are harmful or dangerous, (b) cognitive appraisal that moderates the relationship
between stressors and physiological changes that occur in stressful situations,
and (c) stress reactions, which include emotional arousal and behaviors. Many
other definitions of stress have been promoted. For example, Seyle (1980)
defined stress simply as “the nonspecific response of the body to any demand”
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(p. 127). To summarize, stress is typically considered a stimulus in the
environment or a physiological reaction to a stimulus, versus a subjective
emotional reaction.
Anxiety versus worry. A final term that is often confounded with anxiety in
the literature is that of worry. Worry seems to be the closest of the three terms to
anxiety, and its definition has generated considerable debate; therefore, it will
receive the most discussion. Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, and DePree (1983)
proposed a definition of worry which follows:
Worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden
and relatively uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to
engage in mental problem solving on an issue whose outcome is
uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes.
(p. 10)
O ’ Neill (1985) disagreed with this conception of worry for two reasons.
First, he claimed that the definition does not correspond with the casual use of
the term. For example, if one is “worried” after taking an exam because he/she
fears the score may be low, he/she is not engaging in problem solving, but just
feeling worried about the result (O ’ Neill, 1985). The second argument was that
adding the term worry does not add to the understanding of behavior, because
worry is the cognitive component of anxiety. O’ Neill cited studies that
demonstrated that worry and anxiety both affect behavior in the same way;
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hence, he felt is not meaningful to distinguish the two.
Borkovec (1985) responded to the objection to worry being considered
apart from anxiety by pointing out that studying worry, as one component of
anxiety, could lead to a greater understanding of anxiety as a complex
phenomenon. Borkovec also claimed that problem solving cognition is present in
examples such as a student awaiting a test result. Borkovec framed the issue in
“What if...” terms. For example, the student might say, “What if I get kicked out of
school?", or “What if I have to move home?”, and this, according to Borkovec,
represents a form of problem solving.
Worry appears to be the key component of both trait anxiety and of
generalized anxiety disorder (Eysenck, 1992). According to Eysenck, worry is a
major component of anxiety, specifically, the cognitive component.
To summarize the discussion of anxiety versus other constructs, an
overriding problem is that there is no consensus regarding how the constructs
should be defined, let alone a consensus on how to distinguish them. In the
author’s opinion, anxiety is different from fear in that fear generally results from a
localized source, while the source of anxiety can be diffuse. Anxiety differs from
stress in that stress refers to the properties of a situation or stimulus, whereas
anxiety results from the interpretation of the stimulus as threatening. Finally, the
construct of worry, according to most researchers, can be subsumed under the
category of anxiety, namely, as its cognitive component.
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Theories of Anxiety
Since the time of Freud, numerous theories of anxiety have been
proposed. These theories originate from diverse perspectives in psychology,
including physiology, cognition, emotion, and affect. The difficulty lies in the fact
that none of these theories is widely accepted. Writing in 1989, McReynolds
concluded:
At the present time there is no generally accepted overall theory of
anxiety. Rather, there are a number of restricted conceptions that
concentrate upon limited aspects of the human anxiety experience, (p. 3)
Several theories of anxiety will be reviewed here. The first is that of
Spence and Spence (1966). The theory holds that individuals differ in their
emotional responsiveness, and that they react with different drive (anxiety) levels
as a function of this emotional responsiveness. This variation in drive level
(anxiety level) is said to result in variations in performance on cognitive tasks.
Spence and Spence found that high-anxious individuals tended to make taskirrelevant responses which impaired their performance in some situations,
compared to low-anxious individuals. Whether or not high-anxious individuals
suffered performance decrements on a particular task depended on whether
task-irrelevant responses were detrimental or facilitating to performance. Spence
and Spence found that under conditions of stress or threat, task-irrelevant
responses resulted in detriments in performance for high-anxious individuals.
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Spielberger (1966) conducted a series of experiments to test the presumptions of
drive theory, in the context of anxiety’s effect on complex learning and academic
achievement Spielberger found support for Spence and Spence’s theory, in that
high-anxious individuals performed worse than their low-anxious counterparts on
complex or difficult tasks that elicited a number of competing responses,
compared to simple learning tasks that elicited few competing response
tendencies. Spielberger also found that inducing anxiety maximized the
performance differences between high and low anxious individuals. At the time,
the most frequent measure of anxiety was the Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
1953, as cited in Spielberger, 1966). Spielberger was unclear whether he was
assessing characteristics of the situation or characteristics of the individual using
this instrument; this may have led to his development of the Trait-State Anxiety
Theory, to be discussed next.
Possibly the most prominent theory in the anxiety literature is
Spielberger’s (1972) Trait-State Anxiety Theory. The distinction between
transient, short-term (state) anxiety, and the chronic predisposition to (trait)
anxiety, was first identified by Cattell and Scheier (1960). According to
Spielberger, state anxiety is a temporary emotional state characterized by
subjective feelings of worry and apprehension and autonomic arousal. He
claimed that an individual will experience state anxiety in situations that are
subjectively regarded as threatening, even if there is no objective danger
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present. Trait anxiety, in contrast, represents a predisposition in an individual to
feel state anxiety across a wide variety of situations. It is a relatively stable
personality characteristic. Spielberger’s theory predicts that people high in trait
anxiety are likely to perceive a larger variety of situations as threatening, and to
feel anxiety with greater intensity, than those low in trait anxiety.
Spielberger’s (1972) theory also identified which situations would be likely
to be perceived as threatening for high and low trait anxious individuals.
According to Spielberger, those high in trait anxiety are likely to find evaluative
situations as more threatening than those low in trait anxiety. Situations involving
a threat of physical danger, in contrast, tend to be perceived similarly in threat
level for those low and high in trait anxiety. The theory predicts differences in
performance on cognitive tasks for high and low trait anxious individuals.
According to Spielberger, high trait anxious individuals will be likely to suffer
performance decrements when they feel threatened (when state anxiety levels
are elevated), and that this is likely to occur when: (a) the task or its instructions
involve direct or implied threats to self-esteem, or (b) the task is difficult.
Spielberger noted that there are individual differences in what situations one
finds threatening, and that it is important to take actual measures of state anxiety
rather than assume a given situation will be threatening and will result in
elevated state anxiety.
Tests of Spielberger’s (1972) theory have yielded mixed results. It
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appears that the relationship between trait anxiety, state anxiety, and
performance on cognitive tasks is more complex than Spielberger might have
predicted. Research has attempted to outline the differences in the cognitive
processing, physiological responses, and behavior of high trait anxious and low
trait anxious individuals. While gains have been made in predicting the
circumstances under which trait anxiety moderates various outcomes, no
theoretical model has yet been advanced to explain these results. As Eysenck
(1991) pointed out:
It is very clear from the literature that individuals high and low in trait
anxiety differ significantly in behavioral, physiological, and cognitive
functioning, and it seems important for theory to account for these
differences. This might not be necessary if responses from all three
systems were concordant, but there are numerous cases in which little or
no concordance has been obtained, (p. 82)
While Eysenck (1991) did not offer a theoretical model to fill this void in
the research, he did conduct one of many empirical studies in the area,
attempting to delineate the effects of trait anxiety on one outcome: cognitive
processing. In this study, Eysenck used a dichotic listening task with threatening
and non-threatening cues to determine the processing differences between low
and high trait anxious individuals. He found that high trait anxious individuals
devoted more cognitive processing to threatening words than did low trait
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anxious individuals. While interesting, this result does not directly translate into
predictions about the implications of such processing. It could be that increased
processing leads to higher quality outcomes because of more thorough search,
or conversely, that increased processing leads to hypervigilance and lower
quality outcomes. As noted by Eysenck, a theoretical model is needed to fully
explain the antecedents and consequences of the differences in processing
between low and high trait anxious individuals.
As in the study by Eysenck (1991), most research on trait anxiety has
involved a manipulation of threat. As will be discussed in more detail later in the
chapter, the purpose of manipulating threat has been to maximize the
differences between high and low trait anxious individuals. According to
Spielberger (1972), the main difference between low and high trait anxious
individuals lies in their perception of and response to threat.
The remainder of the chapter will outline research on the effects of anxiety
on cognitive tasks and problem solving. In the following section, research will be
reviewed which has examined the effect of anxiety on well-defined problems.
The research in this area is vast and contains a wide variety of manipulations
and variables. For example, some researchers have examined the effect of trait
anxiety, some have examined state anxiety as it exists naturally, others have
induced state anxiety, and others have studied the joint effects of state and trait
anxiety. Several of the most relevant studies will be reviewed.
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Consequences of Anxiety
Many researchers have studied the effect of varying intensity levels of
state anxiety on cognitive processing and problem solving. The results for
participants experiencing extreme levels of state anxiety have been consistent:
Extreme anxiety has an adverse effect on almost any activity. One study of the
effect of high state anxiety on a task was conducted by Patrick (1934). He used
a task which had been developed by Hamilton in 1916. The problem consisted of
an enclosure that had four exit doors evenly spaced. On each trial, only one of
the doors was unlocked, and the position of the unlocked door changed on each
trial. The participant’s task was to find this open door. The most efficient way to
do this was to try each of the other three doors that had not been locked on the
previous trial.
Patrick found a range of solutions that were typically used by both human
and animal participants. As would be expected, humans who were solving the
problem under normal conditions tended to use optimal solutions, while rats,
under normal conditions, exhibited less effective methods for finding the open
door. Under conditions of severe anxiety (cold water streams blasted at
participants, electric shocks), however, human responses tended to mimic those
of rats, becoming much more ineffectual. The effect of extreme anxiety on
problem solving is clear.
For moderate levels of anxiety, the effect of anxiety on behavior and
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problem solving is more complex, and is moderated by characteristics of the
task, characteristics of the situation, and characteristics of the individual. The
literature in this area is vast and rather disconnected, in that no agreed-upon
theory of anxiety guides the predictions. Many of the researchers whose work
will be reviewed have examined competing theories regarding why anxiety has
an effect on problem solving performance, in addition to predicting whether or
when anxiety will affect performance.
In one of the earliest studies on anxiety and problem solving, Montague
(1953) found that high anxious participants performed slightly better on an easy
list of nonsense syllables they were to memorize, but poorer on a difficult list,
than their less-anxious counterparts. Montague explained his results in terms of
drive theory, contending that with difficult tasks there are more competing
responses, and that high-anxious individuals are especially likely to be affected
by these, resulting in impaired performance. The distinction between trait and
state anxiety had not yet been made; it is unclear whether Montague was
measuring a stable personality characteristic or some temporary effect of the
situation. It is possible that the difficult task induced state anxiety in high traitanxious participants and this elevated state anxiety impaired performance;
conversely, it is possible that the task (whether easy or difficult) did not induce
anxiety, and that the findings indicated that high trait-anxious individuals perform
more poorly on difficult tasks regardless of elevated state anxiety.
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Another study that examined the interfering cognitive responses of those
high in anxiety was that of Fabry and Dvorakova (1992). These researchers
studied the effect of anxiety on risky decision making in chemical operators.
They found that under conditions of threat, anxiety reduces cognitive control and
prolongs the time needed to come to a decision. The explanation given by Fabry
and Dvorakova involves the shift of focus in high and low anxious individuals.
According to Fabry and Dvorakova, under conditions of threat or stress, high
anxious individuals tend to focus on themselves and on cues irrelevant to the
task, while low anxious individuals tend to focus on cues relevant to the task.
This task-irrelevant focusing by high anxious individuals leads to prolonged time
being used for problem solving and to the generation of lower quality solutions.
In a third study on the possible cognitive interference experienced by
those high in anxiety, Zarantonello, Slaymaker, Johnson, & Petzel (1984)
examined the effects of anxiety and depression on several components related
to anagram performance. Seventy-two participants were selected on the basis of
their (high or low) scores on the trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger, 1983), the Beck Depression Inventory, or both. Each participant
was given 60 anagrams to solve in 5 minutes. They then completed a
questionnaire which assessed their feelings of cognitive interference and their
subjective evaluation of their performance on the task.
Results of the Zarantonello et al. (1984) study revealed that high trait
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anxious participants tended to solve fewer anagrams than their low trait anxious
counterparts. High trait anxious participants reported spending significantly
longer thinking about how well they were performing the task (cognitive
interference), and reported a significantly more negative evaluation of their
performance, than low anxious participants. The authors attributed their findings
to the effect of trait anxiety. An alternative explanation, however, is that the
instructions to participants to complete as many anagrams as they could in 5
minutes elevated their state anxiety, and thus the high trait anxious participants
suffered performance impairments on the task. It can be therefore be argued that
the results obtained by Zarantonello et al. were a combined function of high trait
and state anxiety induced by a time limit. State anxiety data were not collected,
so this hypothesis is merely speculatory.
To summarize the three previous examinations of anxiety on problem
solving performance, it is possible that individuals high in trait anxiety will
experience impaired problem solving performance when: (a) the task is difficult,
or (b) the decision maker is under stress or threat.
The focus of the chapter will now turn to studies examining competing
theories of why anxiety has an effect on performance. The first to be discussed
was conducted by MacLeod and Donneiian (1993). According to these
researchers, two characteristics of the task have been found to reliably influence
the relationship between anxiety and problem solving success: task difficulty and
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task requirements, in terms of the need for strategic processing (MacLeod &
Donnellan, 1993). Highly anxious individuals tend to experience performance
deficits on relatively difficult cognitive tasks, but not on easy tasks. Eysenck's
(1982) review of this research reported that over 20 studies have found that the
performance of highly anxious individuals suffers most for difficult, as compared
to easy, tasks. MacLeod and Donnellan reported that anxiety deficits are most
often found when the task requires strategic, rather than automatic, processing
of information. Eysenck’s explanation of this finding incorporates the need for
working memory capacity. According to Eysenck, complex cognitive tasks are
more likely to make use of strategic processes, which require more working
memory resources than those tasks that make use of automatic processes. This
latter moderator of the relationship between anxiety and problem solving is more
controversial than the first; thus, MacLeod and Donnellan sought to provide a
more definitive examination of it.
MacLeod and Donnellan (1993) measured decision latencies on a
grammatical reasoning task, performed under conditions of either a low or a high
memory load. Three hypotheses were tested. The first was that the performance
deficit resulting from high anxiety on complex tasks would be manifested through
longer decision latencies for high than for low anxious participants. The second
was that all participants would show longer decision latencies under the high
simultaneous memory load condition than under the low simultaneous memory
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load condition. The final prediction was that an interaction between the first two
hypotheses would be found. Specifically, it was predicted that high anxious
participants would show especially slow decision latencies under the high
simultaneous memory load condition.
The results of this study indicated that higher trait anxiety is related to
performance deficits on complex cognitive tasks. Specifically, high trait anxious
participants exhibited significantly longer response latencies than low trait
anxious participants. The results of this study were consistent with Eysenck’s
(1982) theory that working memory is the crucial factor in explaining the
performance deficits experienced by high trait anxious individuals performing
complex cognitive tasks.
In another attempt to predict and explain the effects of anxiety on problem
solving performance, Paulman and Kennedy (1984) examined test anxiety and
exam skills in the context of cognitive task performance. Their goal was to
attempt to resolve the conflicting findings in studies on the performance of high
and low anxious individuals. Most studies had found that high anxious individuals
perform worse on cognitive tasks than those low in trait anxiety, but some
studies had found no deficit for high anxious individuals. Paulman and Kennedy
identified the skid of being able to focus one’s attention as a moderator which
may account for these results. A person high in trait anxiety who is able to focus
his/her attention may suffer no performance deficit on the primary task, but if
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additional, concurrent tasks are presented, performance should be worse than
that of low anxious individuals.
Leon (1989) examined the extent to which state anxiety influences the
inclusiveness of information processing. Leon reviewed previous research which
had generally found that anxiety impairs performance on a variety of tasks. She
noted that most researchers explain this decrement in performance in terms of
the anxious individual’s failure to include all relevant information. Leon examined
several possible processes which could account for the incomplete processing of
information by high state anxious individuals. The first is the possibility that
anxious individuals have a reduced range of cue utilization. The second is the
tendency of high anxious individuals to divide their limited processing resources
between task relevant and task irrelevant concerns. Support for this possibility
comes from research findings that indicate high anxious individuals experience
more unrelated cognitions, engage in more off-task glancing, spend less time
attending to the task, and work more slowly on tasks than low anxious
individuals. The third possibility is a reduction in working memory capacity
caused by high anxiety. This theory was developed by Eysenck (1979) who
assumed that anxious individuals have reduced processing capabilities, and
divide their limited resources among task-relevant and task-irrelevant
information, thus creating a dual-task situation. Eysenck further posits that
working memory is the part of the processing system most directly affected by
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this concurrent processing. The capacity of working memory is limited, and the
division of this limited capacity among task relevant and task irrelevant concerns
leads to performance decrements for high anxious problem solvers.
Leon (1989) used an analogical reasoning task to accomplish two goals:
first, to assess the inclusiveness of information processing for high and low state
anxious individuals, and second, to identify the cognitive processes responsible
for any differences in performance between high and low anxious individuals.
The task was such that participants were allowed to make two types of errors.
The first type was errors of exclusion, in which an incorrect solution would result
from excluding relevant information. The second type was errors of inclusion, in
which an incorrect solution would result from the inclusion of irrelevant task
information. Several variations on the analogy task were used.
Related to the first purpose of examining the inclusiveness of information
processing, Leon (1989) found that high state anxious individuals made
significantly more inclusion errors regardless of task, and more exclusion errors
with few-transformation analogies, than low anxious participants. Related to the
second purpose of the study, that of examining cognitive processes responsible
for the performance decrement for high anxious participants, Leon found support
for the second set of predictions made by attentional theory and working memory
capacity theory. These predictions are that high state anxious participants are in
a dual-task situation, and will thus experience a reduction in processing speed
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which leads to a strategy of lowered information processing. Leon concluded that
state anxiety leads people to divide their attentional and/or working memory
resources between relevant and irrelevant information. This division of cognitive
resources leads to a reduction in information processing rate, and lowers the
amount of information processed.
The previous studies examined the influence of anxiety on task
performance. But can state or trait anxiety be induced or elevated by the
problem solving task itself? Riedel, Taylor, and Melnyk (1983) sought to answer
this question. They examined the effect of creative and non-creative problem
solving on state and trait anxiety. Humanistic theorists had claimed that creative
problem solving raises state anxiety, and Riedel et al. sought to examine this
prediction. They tested two hypotheses using 57 undergraduate participants.
The first hypothesis was that a divergent (creative) problem solving task would
raise state anxiety as compared to a convergent or neutral problem solving task,
and second, that trait anxiety would be unaffected by the type of problem solving
task. Participants completed both the state and trait scales of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983), before and after the task. The task in all
conditions involved a list of thirty common objects, such as “book”, “tie”, “rope”,
etc. In the divergent condition, participants were instructed to list as many
possible uses for each object as they could. In the convergent condition,
instructions were to define each word. Finally, in the neutral problem solving
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condition, participants were to copy each of the thirty words sixty times, as
quickly as they could. In addition, participants rated the problem solving task in
terms of adjectives such as “difficult,” “boring,” etc.
Contrary to the first hypothesis, Riedel et al. (1983) found that the neutral
problem solving condition led to the largest increase in state anxiety. The
divergent (creative) problem solving condition led to the smallest increase in
state anxiety, and the convergent problem solving condition resulted in a
moderate increase in state anxiety. Consistent with the second hypothesis, trait
anxiety scores were unaffected by the problem solving condition. For the post
task evaluation scale, divergent problem solving was rated as more enjoyable,
less stressful, less annoying, and less difficult than convergent and neutral
problem solving.
Several points can be made about this study. First, as noted by the
researchers, instructions in the neutral condition to copy the words as fast as one
could eliminated this condition as an effective control group. One of the most
common methods for inducing state anxiety has been to administer time
pressure, so it was to be expected that this condition would result in the greatest
increase in state anxiety. The authors pointed out that a better test of this
hypothesis would have been to keep the instructions consistent across
conditions, except for the manipulation. Second, the fact that trait anxiety (as
measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) did not increase across the three
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conditions supports Spielberger’s (1983) claim that the trait anxiety scale is
“relatively impervious to the conditions under which it is given” (p. 11). Third, the
results demonstrate that state anxiety can be affected (increased) by the
problem solving task, although the researchers did not examine the effects of
this increased anxiety on the solutions generated in any of the conditions.
Perhaps elevated anxiety would have resulted in impaired performance; for
example, a lower number of possible uses for items in the divergent condition,
less correct definitions of words in the convergent condition, and fewer words
copied in the neutral condition. Finally, the researchers in this study did not
examine differences in state anxiety and perceptions of the problem solving task
as a function of participants’ trait anxiety. Perhaps trait anxiety would have
moderated the extent to which participants’ state anxiety was increased by the
task, as well as possibly influencing the quality and quantity of the solutions they
generated.
Much of the research on anxiety and problem solving has been focused
on well-defined tasks that have one correct answer, such as anagram completion
and word definition. Several studies have attempted to increase the
generalizability of anxiety research, and two of these will be reviewed next.
In one study that attempted to increase the generalizability of anxiety
research, Mayer (1977) examined the joint effects of trait and state anxiety on
task performance, with both clerical or “rote” tasks and general reasoning or
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“cognitive” tasks. Mayer sought to improve the generalizability of anxiety
research by including more complicated problems than had been previously
used. Mayer employed a task overload manipulation by giving participants a set
of problems to solve without enough time to finish. The independent variables
were trait anxiety (high versus low), pacing (self-paced versus experimenter
paced), and type of task (rote versus general reasoning/cognitive). The
dependent variables were solution time and proportion correct. Mayer predicted
interactions between pacing and task, between pacing and trait anxiety, and
between trait anxiety and task.
The tasks used in Mayer’s (1977) study were classified into clerical/Tote”
and tasks and general reasoningfcognitive” tasks. The rote tasks included a
target search for all instances of a particular letter in a passage and 60 division
and subtraction problems with two- and three-digit numbers. The cognitive tasks
included anagrams, a matchstick problem, connecting nine dots with four
consecutive lines, and a card trick. Each participant was assigned to a trait
anxiety condition based on his/her score on the STAI, and randomly assigned to
a pacing condition. Each participant completed all eight tasks. The hypotheses
were tested in three separate studies.
Experiment one examined pacing and type of task, without regard to trait
anxiety. Results revealed that self-paced participants performed better (higher
proportion correct) on the rote tasks, and poorer on the cognitive tasks, than
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experimenter-paced participants. Experiment two examined trait anxiety and
pacing. Eight tasks (4 rote, 4 cognitive) were completed by all participants.
Mayer found that self-pacing had no effect on the performance (proportion
correct) of low trait anxious participants, but improved the performance of high
trait anxious participants. Results for solution times were similar. Further analysis
of this result indicated that the performance of the self paced / high anxious
individuals increased during the second half of the experimental session.
Experiment three examined trait anxiety and pacing, with all participants
completing four rote and four cognitive tasks. Results of experiment three
indicated that for solution times: (a) self-pacing led to better performance than
experimenter-pacing, (b) high trait anxiety led to lowered performance, (c) self
pacing had no effect on low-anxious, but improved the performance of highanxious participants, and (d) high and low anxious participants performed about
the same on the rote tasks, but high anxious individuals performed much worse
on the cognitive tasks. For proportion correct, results followed a similar pattern.
Mayer (1977) devoted a brief discussion section to the seemingly
conflicting findings that high anxiety led to better performance regardless of task
when pacing was self-administered, but led to poorer performance regardless of
pacing when the task was a cognitive one. Mayer cited Sarason’s (1960) concept
of “situational reaction”, which states that high-anxious individuals may at first
react to self-pacing in task-irrelevant ways, but eventually gain momentum as the
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experimental session continues. Perhaps self-pacing allowed high trait anxious
participants to reduce the state anxiety that would normally be induced by the
time limit in which to solve the problems. As noted earlier, trait anxiety generally
leads to performance decrements only under conditions of elevated state
anxiety. The finding that trait anxiety led to poorer performance when the task
was more complex is consistent with prior research.
The present author would argue that this study did not meet its goal of
increasing the generalizability of anxiety research. While a target search for a
particular letter in a passage is admittedly less complex and “real-world” than
connecting nine dots with four lines, it is arguable whether either task actually
“approximates the circumstances of the overburdened worker” (p. 283), as
Mayer asserted. Both the rote and the cognitive tasks used in this study had a
correct answer, and could be classified as well-defined problems. In the real
world, individuals must face unstructured, ill-defined problems that have many
possible correct solutions; the study of these would increase the generalizability
of anxiety research.
In another examination of real-world problem solving, Nezu (1985)
conducted a correlational study of psychological distress in self-appraised
effective and ineffective problem solvers. According to Nezu, social problem
solving refers to the process by which individuals discover effective ways to cope
with the problems encountered in daily life. The goal of this study was to
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examine the role of individual differences in everyday problem solving
effectiveness. Participants were 213 undergraduates who completed the
Problem Solving Inventory, a measure of individuals’ self-reported problem
solving behavior and attitudes. Those who scored at least one standard
deviation above or below the mean were recruited for the remainder of the study
as ineffective and effective problem solvers, respectively.
The participants in Nezu’s (1985) study completed four additional
inventories: (a) Beck Depression Inventory, (b) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, (c)
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale, and (d) Problem Check List. The
results were analyzed for sex differences; the responses of males and females
did not differ significantly on any of the measures. Nezu found that self-reported
ineffective problem solvers were significantly more depressed, experienced
higher state and trait anxiety, had a more external locus of control, reported more
frequent current problems and were more distressed by these problems, than
self-reported effective problem solvers.
As noted by Nezu, the correlational design of this study prevents any
conclusions regarding causation. It is possible that effective problem solving
leads one to have fewer problems, and thus less depression and anxiety, or that
being depressed and anxious impairs one’s problem solving ability. Another
limitation noted by the author was that the sample included only the extreme
ends of the problem solving continuum. The findings may not be readily
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generalizable to the typical problem solver. A follow-up to this study would be to
add some real-world problems and measure participants’ actual problem solving
effectiveness, not just their self-appraised effectiveness.
It is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from the previous research on
state and trait anxiety. The independent and dependent variables examined in
these studies, the hypotheses advanced, the conclusions drawn, and the quality
of the research, vary significantly. Despite this difficulty, several findings have
been rather consistent across the variables examined and level of anxiety
measured: (a) decrements in performance of those high in trait anxiety are
generally only observed under conditions of elevated state anxiety, and when
state anxiety is elevated, those high in trait anxiety are generally less effective at
completing cognitive tasks, (b) the aforementioned performance decrement is
more likely to occur when the task is complex and/or difficult, and (c) state
anxiety can be induced by the problem solving task itself.
This Investigation
Overview. The research presented thus far has examined a crucial step in
the problem solving/decision making process, that of solution generation. When
generating solutions to a problem, one technique for assisting the problem solver
is to provide some structure to the problem. The structuring method examined in
the previously discussed research was the presentation of objectives. Objectives
do not add additional information beyond that which is already present in the
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problem, they merely make certain aspects of the problem more salient so as to
highlight the essential conflict inherent in the problem. This presentation of
objectives, it is hypothesized, will lead to a larger number of solutions, higher
quality solutions, or both, depending on how the objectives are presented.
Prior research has shown that the way a problem is structured influences
the quantity and quality of solutions generated to ill-structured problems. Pitz et
al. (1980) were the first to examine the question of how the presentation of
objectives, as a structuring technique, influences the solution generation
process. Their goal was to examine structuring as a way to improve decision
quality by insuring that all relevant alternatives are considered. Pitz et al. asked
participants to generate solutions to several real-world problems, for which eight
objectives each had been identified. Participants were randomly assigned to
objective conditions, in which they were given either all eight objectives
simultaneously, one objective at a time, two objectives at a time, or no
objectives. The dependent variable was the quantity of solutions generated. Pitz
et al. found that presenting one objective at a time led participants to generate
more alternatives than presenting many objectives simultaneously or two
objectives at a time. While this study provided an important foundation for future
work in the area of problem structuring and solution generation, several
questions remained. For example, does the generation of more alternatives
necessarily equate with the generation of more good alternatives? What factors,
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such as individual difference variables, influence the relationship between
structuring and solution generation? Later research by Scherer and Billings
(1999) and Butler and Scherer (1997) examined these questions.
Scherer and Billings (1999) used two real-world problems that had been
used in the Pitz et al. (1980) study. Participants were assigned to one of four
objective conditions: one-objective-at-a-time, two conflicting objectives, two
congruent objectives, or no objectives. Scherer and Billings expanded the
research of Pitz et al. by using two measures of quantity (number of non
repeating alternatives and number of categories of alternatives) and by adding a
measure of quality (resolving power). Resolving power is defined as the degree
to which a solution addresses conflicting aspects of the problem (Upshaw, 1975).
It was operationalized both as the average resolving power of all alternatives
generated by each participant, as well as the number of highly resolving
solutions generated by each participant. Scherer and Billings hypothesized that
structuring through objectives would influence both the quantity and quality of
alternatives generated. As predicted, presenting one objective at a time led
participants to generate more solutions than presenting no objectives or
conflicting objectives. For solution quality, the results were more complex.
Scherer and Billings found that whether problem structuring through the
presentation of objectives led to higher quality solutions depended on the type of
problem, the operationalization of quality, and the order of problem presentation.
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In addition, significant two- and three-way interactions complicated the findings.
In interpreting the complex results, Scherer and Billings hypothesized that the
emotional overtones present in the solutions for one of the problems may have
been an indicator that emotions were clouding the participants’ judgements and
restricting their ability and/or willingness to pay attention to the structuring
manipulation. Scherer and Billings also hypothesized that moderators could be
influencing the results, such as familiarity or emotional involvement with the
problem.
Butler and Scherer (1997) further expanded this line of research by
adding a moderator variable, that of expertise. They found that presenting one
objective at a time led to the generation of alternatives with higher resolving
power than presenting no objectives. Also, the conflicting objectives condition
elicited more resolving alternatives than the no objectives condition, although this
effect did not reach significance. Again, the results were complicated by a
significant three-way interaction between objectives, problem, and problem
order. An acceptable conclusion to be drawn from the research on problem
structuring through objectives seems to be that structuring influences the quality
of solutions to a greater extent for non-emotionally involving problems than for
emotionally involving problems.
This area of research is in its infancy, as the three studies noted above
are the only ones examining problem structuring effects on solution generation
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for ill-structured problems. The present study seeks to replicate and further
explore the findings of these previous studies, as well as to examine another
possible moderator of the problem structuring/solution generation relationship,
that of trait anxiety.
Trait anxiety has been shown to affect performance on a variety of
cognitive tasks or problems. However, all of these tasks could be classified as
well-structured, well-defined problems. No studies have identified the effects of
trait anxiety on the solving of ill-defined, real-world problems. As noted by
Heppneret al. (1982):
Much of the earlier problem-solving research examined how people
solved impersonal predefined laboratory problems such as puzzles,
anagrams, and water-jar problems. These predefined problems are
different than the real-life personal problems that daily confront people,
and there is evidence to suggest that the manner in which the laboratory
problems are solved may be less complex than personal problems.
(p. 580)
Many researchers have examined the effects of high trait anxiety on
performance of well-defined problems. For example, Zarantonello et al. (1984)
found that high trait anxious individuals tended to solve fewer anagrams, to
report spending longer thinking about how well they were performing the task
(cognitive interference), and to report a more negative evaluation of their
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performance, than their low trait anxious counterparts. Other research has
generally confirmed this finding, that when state anxiety is elevated, and/or when
the task is difficult or complex, anxiety typically leads to a decrement in
performance on cognitive tasks.
In an attempt to increase the generalizability of anxiety research, Mayer
(1977) studied the effects of trait anxiety, type of task (“rote” versus “cognitive”),
and pacing (self-paced versus experimenter paced) on performance. Mayer
found that: (a) self-pacing led to better performance than experimenter pacing,
(b) high trait anxiety led to lowered performance, (c) self-pacing had no effect on
low-anxious, but improved the performance of high-anxious participants, and (d)
high and low anxious participants performed about the same on the rote tasks,
but high anxious individuals performed much worse on the cognitive tasks. The
present author would argue that this study did not meet its goal of increasing the
generalizability of anxiety research, because even the “cognitive” tasks were
well-defined decision problems, with definite correct answers.
As discussed earlier, it is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from the
previous research on anxiety. Several findings have been rather consistent
across the variables examined and level of anxiety measured: (a) decrements in
performance of those high in trait anxiety are generally only observed under
conditions of elevated state anxiety, and when state anxiety is elevated, those
high in trait anxiety are generally less effective at completing cognitive tasks, (b)
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the aforementioned performance decrement is more pronounced when the task
is complex and/or difficult, and (c) state anxiety can be induced by the problem
solving task itself.
The first independent variable in the current investigation was problem
objectives. Participants received either one objective, conflicting objectives, or no
objectives. The second independent variable was trait anxiety, measured using
the trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). All
participants generated solutions to an ill-structured problem which appears in
Appendix A. The dependent variables were quantity and quality (resolving
power) of solutions generated.
Predicted effects of problem structuring and trait anxiety on solution
quantity. Prior research (Butler & Scherer, 1997; Pitz et al., 1980; Scherer &
Billings, 1999) has found that the presentation of one problem objective at a time
leads participants to generate a greater number of solutions than the
presentation of no objectives or the presentation of conflicting objectives.
Presenting objectives one at a time facilitates the generation of a large number
of alternatives.
Hypothesis one. Both low and high trait anxious participants will generate
more alternatives in the one-objective-at-a-time condition than in the
conflicting objectives condition and the no objectives condition.
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Predicted effects of problem structuring and anxiety on resolving power of
solutions. Baron and Kenny (1986) describe a moderator effect as an
“...interaction between a focal independent variable and a factor that specifies
the appropriate conditions for its operation” (p. 1174). In the present study, it was
predicted that trait anxiety would serve as a moderator of the relationship
between problem structuring and resolving power of solutions generated. In
other words, trait anxiety would specify when problem structuring would have an
effect on solution generation.
Prior research has found that high trait anxiety generally impairs
performance under conditions of elevated state anxiety. It was predicted that the
resolving power of solutions would be reduced in the no objectives and
conflicting objectives conditions, as compared to the one-objective-at-a-time
condition. This hypothesis is based on the notion that being presented with
conflicting objectives simultaneously or no objectives will increase high trait
anxious participants’ state anxiety. Riedel et al. (1983) found that state anxiety
could be elevated by a problem solving task, but did not examine this elevation
as a function of trait anxiety. It is predicted that participants high in trait anxiety
will suffer performance decrements due to elevated state anxiety, and that this
state anxiety elevation will occur in the conflicting objectives condition and the no
objectives condition. As noted by Pitz et al. (1980), structuring may improve
decision quality by insuring that all relevant alternatives are considered. The no
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objectives condition should elevate state anxiety relative to the one-objective-ata-time condition because this helpful aid is not present. Prior research has
shown that giving participants conflicting objectives simultaneously leads them to
generate fewer solutions than when given objectives one at a time (Butler &
Scherer, 1997; Scherer & Billings, 1999). This finding can be taken as evidence
that the task of generating solutions is more complex and/or difficult under the
condition of conflicting objectives than under the one-objective-at-a-time
condition. When presented with conflicting objectives simultaneously,
participants are considering more information about the problem, and the
essential conflict of the problem is made salient. Mayer (1977) found that trait
anxiety is more likely to lead to performance decrements for complex tasks. The
author would argue that presenting conflicting objectives simultaneously
increases the complexity of the task, beyond that of the one-objective-at-a-time
condition. Participants high in trait anxiety will suffer performance decrements
(reductions in resolving power of solutions) in both the conflicting objectives and
no objectives conditions, but for different reasons.
Hypothesis two. Participants high in trait anxiety will generate solutions
lower in resolving power than those low in trait anxiety in the conflicting
objectives condition and in the no objectives condition, as compared to
the one-objective-at-a-time condition.
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Method
Overview
The study used a regression model to examine the effect of problem
structuring (conflicting objectives versus one objective versus no objectives) and
trait anxiety (high versus low) on the quantity and quality of solutions generated.
Data collection was carried out in two parts. Participation in Part I consisted of
completing three questionnaires. Order of the three scales was counterbalanced,
with each of the six possible order combinations being equally represented.
Participation in Part II consisted of generating solutions to a problem and
completing several questionnaires. Students had to complete both parts of the
study in order to receive research credit. Packets given to participants in Part I of
the study were randomly labeled yellow, orange, and red, and when participants
arrived at Part II they were given packets with none, one at a time, and
conflicting objectives, respectively. Dividing the experiment into two parts
allowed time to elapse between the administration of the anxiety measure (trait
anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, 1983) and the
generation of alternatives in order to avoid sensitizing participants to the nature
of the investigation. Embedding the anxiety measure among two other scales in
the packet (Need for Cognition Scale, Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; and a
social problem solving scale, a variation of the Social Problem-Solving Inventory,
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990) served to further mask the purpose of the study. This
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method of data collection served to increase the number of participants willing to
volunteer because some of the materials could be completed at their
convenience, as well as increasing participation rates for Part II because
completion of both parts of the study was required in order to receive credit.
Participants classified as either high or low trait anxious, generated
alternatives to an ill-structured problem under one of the three problem
structuring conditions. The dependent variables were quantity and quality of
solutions generated.
Participants

Participants were 184 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology
courses at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The sample consisted of 48
males and 135 females (and one participant who did not report gender).
Participants were volunteers who received course credit for participating. The
strategy for sampling was to approach potential volunteers at the end of their
psychology classes. Students were introduced to the purpose and nature of the
study, and were informed that both parts of the study must be completed in order
for them to receive research credit. Volunteers then received a packet and
signed up for a time to participate in Part II. An informed consent form was the
first item in the packet. Participants were instructed to read the consent form
before they completed any of the measures, and a label on the packet gave
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them instructions on where to return the packet if they read the consent form and
then decided not to participate.
Problem
All participants generated solutions to an ill-structured problem, which
depicted a college-aged student research assistant who needs research
experience to gain admission to graduate school but is unhappy with the current
assignment. The problem used was created by Pitz et al. (1980) and appears in
Appendix A. This problem was included in a taxonomy study of affective and
cognitive reactions to problems (Scherer, Weiss, Reiter-Palmon, & Goodman,
1996). Table 1 presents a comparison between the cognitive and affective
reactions of participants to the research problem and across the twelve problems
examined by Scherer et al. Participants perceived the research problem as being
lower in complexity, more boring, and easier to solve (higher problem-based
efficacy), than the average of the twelve problems. This may indicate that the
research problem, although complex and ill-structured, was not extremely
difficult, but more likely of moderate difficulty. The name of the central figure in
the problem was changed from “Joan” (Scherer et al.) to “Chris” in order to
achieve gender neutrality.
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Table 1
Cognitive and Affective Reaction Scale Means and Standard Deviations for the
Research Problem

Problem complexity
Problem realism
Problem-based efficacy
Reaction to conflict resolution
Emotional involvement
Negative arousal
Elation
Fear
Boredom
Positive arousal

Research Problem
SD
Mean
1.0
3.3
0.9
4.8
4.1
1.1
3.4
0.9
2.8
1.0
0.8
3.6
3.1
0.6
3.5
0.9
3.9
3.9
3.2
3.2

Overall
Mean
3.8
5.1
3.9
3.9
3.3
3.9
3.0
3.8
3.1
3.5

SD
1.2
0.8
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.7
1.0
1.1
0.8

Note. Scale ranges from 1 - 7; higher numbers indicate a higher level of the
construct. N = 2148.
Independent Variables
Trait anxiety. The first independent variable was trait anxiety. Participants
completed the trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983).
Participants scoring above the median were classified as high trait-anxious and
those scoring below the median were considered low trait-anxious. The median
trait anxiety score was 38.
Anxiety was measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI;
Spielberger, 1983). The STAI is a self-report instrument which measures both
state and trait anxiety. The state anxiety scale of the STAI consists of twenty
statements for which individuals rate the extent to which they feel that way right
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now on a 4-point scale, using (1) not at all, (2) somewhat, (3) moderately so, and
(4) very much so. The trait anxiety scale of the STAI also consists of twenty
statements, only with instructions for respondents to identify how they generally
feel. Spielberger (1983) defined trait anxiety as “relatively stable individual
differences between people in the tendency to perceive stressful situations as
dangerous or threatening and to respond to such situations with elevations in the
intensity of their state anxiety reactions” (p. 5).
The STAI underwent a major revision in 1979. Spielberger (1983) noted
three reasons for this revision: (a) to more clearly differentiate between anxiety
and other constructs (such as depression), (b) to replace items with weak
psychometric properties, and (c) to improve the factor structure of the trait
anxiety scale. The STAI includes items that assess anxiety as well as items
which assess calmness and serenity, such that an individual’s score can be
placed on a continuum that ranges from very calm, to somewhat anxious, to very
anxious (Spielberger, 1972).
The STAI has been used in a wide variety of settings including clinical,
psychiatric, military, and college settings. It has been used in over 2,000 studies
(Spielberger, 1983) and has been translated into over thirty languages. The STAI
was used in the present study due to its demonstration of reliability and validity in
previous studies. Spielberger (1983) collected normative data on the STAI from
855 college students (324 males, 531 females) enrolled in introductory
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psychology courses. The mean state anxiety score for Spielberger’s normative
sample was 36.47 for males and 38.76 for females, and the mean trait anxiety
score was 38.30 for males and 40.40 for females. The alpha reliabilities for the
state form of the STAI were a = .91 for males and a = .93 for females, and for the
trait form were a = .90 for males and a = .91 for females.
The state and trait anxiety data of the present participants were compared
to that of Spielberger’s (1983) normative sample of 855 college students (324
males, 531 females). The mean state anxiety score for males in the present
study

(M = 31.45)

was at the 36th percentile in the norms for male students, and

the mean for females (M = 34.50) was at the 44th percentile in the norms for
female students. The mean trait anxiety score for males in the present study

(M

= 37.32) was at the 52nd percentile in the norms for male students, and the mean
for females

(M = 39.55) was at the

59th percentile in the norms for female

students. Alpha reliability of the state anxiety form of the STAI was a = .93, and
of the trait anxiety form was a = .91 in the present study.
The trait form of the STAI was completed by participants in Part I and the
state form (with additional questions added) was completed in Part II,
immediately after the solution generation task. The trait and state forms of the
STAI appear in Appendix B. An 8-item scale developed by the researcher was
attached to the state anxiety scale of the STAI, and was completed by
participants during Part II. This scale assessed participants’ reactions to the
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experimental situation, as well as whether they were concerned with any
stressful situations in their lives. The purpose of the additional questions was to
further examine individuals' reports of high state anxiety, and to identify outliers.
These additional questions appear after the state form of the STAI in Appendix
B.
Problem structuring. One way to structure a problem is to provide
objectives. Scherer and Billings (1999) defined problem objectives as the specific
outcomes that the generated solutions are intended to achieve. Participants in
the one-objective-at-a-time condition and the conflicting objectives condition
were shown the identical set of four objectives. However, the conflicting
objectives structuring method presented a pair of objectives that conflicted with
one another whereas the one-objective-at-a-time structuring method presented
one objective at a time. This study borrowed from research by Scherer and
Billings (1999) to determine which objectives conflicted with one another.
Scherer and Billings conducted pilot research in which ten graduate students
were presented with a list of solutions and a list of objectives and were asked to
identify which solutions addressed which objectives. Conflicting objectives were
those that were positively correlated with certain objectives and negatively
correlated with other objectives. That is, a pair of objectives were seen as
conflicting to the extent that solutions that would address one objective tended to
preclude the satisfaction of the other objective.
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To carry out the structuring manipulation, participants were given an
instruction sheet stapled to four pages. Participants in the one-objective-at-atime condition and in the conflicting objectives condition each received four
objectives. In the one-objective-at-a-time condition, one objective was placed on
each page, and order of presentation was counterbalanced. In the conflicting
objectives condition, two objectives were on the first page, then a blank page,
then two more objectives, then a blank page. Order of objective presentation
was counterbalanced. In the no objectives condition, instructions to generate all
the alternatives one could think of was on the first page, followed by three blank
pages. The number of pages received by participants in each condition was kept
constant in order to eliminate effects of receiving less or more space to generate
solutions. The experimental stimuli appear in Appendix A.
Dependent Variables
Overview. Solution quantity and quality were independently assessed by
the researcher, one undergraduate student, and two graduate students, blind to
experimental condition. Disagreements were settled through consensus. The
scale used to rate resolving power appears in Appendix C.
Quantity of solutions. Quantity was defined as the number of non
repeating solutions generated by each participant.
Quality of solutions. The measure of solution quality was resolving power.
Resolving power was defined by Upshaw (1975) as the degree to which a
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solution addresses the conflicting components of the problem. It was
operationalized in four ways, as: (a) the number of highly resolving solutions
(those receiving a resolving power rating of 4, 5, or 6 on a 6-point scale, (b) the
average resolving power of all solutions generated, (c) the proportion of highly
resolving solutions (those rated 4, 5, or 6), and (d) the highest resolving power
rating given to the participant’s set of solutions. The process of assessing
solution quality will be discussed in depth later in the chapter, but as an
overview, the process involved condensing the set of verbatim thoughts/solutions
to a set of non-repeating solutions, matching those non-repeating solutions back
to the original data, and collecting independent ratings of the non-repeating
solutions from two graduate students trained in the assessment of solution
quality.
Other Measures
Need for cognition. Need for cognition refers to the tendency to actively
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).
The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale was developed to assess this individual
difference. The purpose of including this scale in the packet distributed in Part I
was to disguise the anxiety measure. Although no predictions were made for this
measure, the scale results will be examined to see if differences among those
high and low in trait anxiety exist. The alpha reliability of the Need for Cognition
Scale was a = .90. The Need for Cognition Scale appears in Appendix B.
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Social problem solving. Social problem solving refers to the process
individuals engage in to cope with problems encountered in daily living (D ’Zurilla
& Nezu, 1982). The measure of social problem solving ability used in the present
study was a variation of the Social Problem-Solving Inventory (D’Zurilla & Nezu,
1990). This social problem solving scale was used by Butler and Scherer (1997),
who added 8 additional items to the 52-item scale. These additional items
assess the extent to which the essential conflict and objectives of a problem are
noted or considered by the problem solver. As with the Need for Cognition Scale,
the purpose of including the measure of social problem solving ability was to
disguise the anxiety measure. No predictions were made for this measure, but
analyses will be conducted to see if trait anxiety is related to self-appraised
social problem solving effectiveness. The alpha reliability of the scale was a =
.94. The social problem solving measure appears in Appendix B.
Demographic questionnaire. This scale consisted of 12 items assessing
participant characteristics such as sex, age, race, and number of college courses
taken. Various versions of the scale have been used in several research studies
at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The purpose of the questionnaire was
to collect information that could be used to compare groups of participants, for
example, to determine whether males and females differ in their level of anxiety.
The demographic questionnaire appears in Appendix B.
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Verbal ability measure. The vocabulary subtest of the Multidimensional
Aptitude Battery (Jackson, 1984) was administered to participants as the last
measure in Part II. The Multidimensional Aptitude Battery (MAB) is a paper-andpencil test consisting of two batteries of five subtests each. It is designed for
adolescent and adult populations and has been used in clinical, research, and
employment settings. Validity data of the various subtests were obtained by
correlating the subtests with components of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981, as
cited in Jackson, 1984). With a sample of 145 respondents, the correlation
between the vocabulary subtest and the WAIS-R was r = .89.
The vocabulary subtest is one of the measures in the Verbal Battery, and
can be used on its own. The vocabulary subtest consists of 46 multiple choice
items which the respondent has seven minutes to complete. The purpose of this
scale was to assess whether differences in those high and low in trait anxiety
were actually due to differences in verbal ability, not the level of anxiety itself.
The vocabulary subtest of the MAB appears in Appendix B.
Procedure
Pilot study. The pilot study was designed to assess whether reports of trait
anxiety, as assessed before the solution generation task, would be increased by
the act of generating solutions. It was desired by the author to only measure trait
anxiety once, earlier in time than the solution generation task, rather than before
and after the task, to avoid sensitizing participants to the nature of the
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investigation. The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that reports of trait
anxiety would not be influenced by the act of generating solutions under various
objective conditions. It was expected that reports of trait anxiety would not
significantly increase after generating solutions, because as Spielberger (1983)
noted, “...it has been demonstrated that the T-Anxiety scale is relatively
impervious to the conditions under which it is given” (p. 11). Trait anxiety is a
personality characteristic which should be unaffected by changes in the situation
or the task.
The design of the pilot study was a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with
position of the trait anxiety scale (before or after solution generation) and
problem objectives (no objectives or conflicting objectives) as the manipulated
variables. The trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
1983) was completed either before or after the problem solving task. Participants
were randomly chosen to receive no objectives or conflicting objectives to
consider while solving the problem. The one-objective-at-a-time condition was
not pilot tested because it was perceived as the least likely condition to arouse
anxiety in the participants.
A total of 48 participants were run in small groups ranging from one to
eight individuals per session. They first read and signed a consent form
explaining the purpose of the study. Participants then completed a packet of
materials. They were told to complete the items in the order in which they were
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presented. This method allowed for manipulation of the position of the trait
anxiety form of the STAI (Spielberger, 1983). Attached to the trait anxiety scale
was a set of three items developed by the author to assess whether the
experimental task, or participating in experiments in general, made participants
anxious, fearful, or nervous. These items, rated on a five-point scale, were as
follows:
(1)

Rate the extent to which being an experimental participant in
general makes you feel anxious or nervous. Choose the number
that corresponds to how anxious or nervous you generally feel in
this situation.

(2)

Rate the extent to which the previous task made you feel fearful.
Choose the number that corresponds to how fearful the task made
you feel.

(3)

Rate the extent to which the previous task made you feel anxious
or nervous. Choose the number that corresponds to how anxious
or nervous the task made you feel.

Participants either generated solutions with various objectives and then
completed the trait anxiety scale, or they completed the trait anxiety scale and
then generated solutions with various objectives. Upon completion of these
tasks, participants were debriefed and given credit for participating.
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Analysis of variance was used to test for mean differences among the 48
participants in the pilot study. Descriptive statistics appear in Table 2. An alpha
level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The main effect of position of the trait
anxiety scale was not statistically significant, (F(1, 43) = .025, p > .05). The main
effect of objective condition was not statistically significant,
(F(1, 43) = 3.971, g > .05). Finally, the interaction of position and objective
condition was not statistically significant, (F(1, 43) = .052, p > .05).
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Average Scale Score by Cell for Pilot
Study
Position of Trait
Anxiety Scale

Objective
Condition

After
After
Before
Before

Conflicting
None
Conflicting
None

Average Trait
Anxiety Scale
Score
2.24
1.97
2.19
1.98

Standard
Deviation
.3755
.4361
.4194
.4120

The main effect for objective condition was nearly significant (g = .053)
and was examined further. The result is somewhat puzzling, because half of the
participants in each objective condition had not yet seen which objective
condition they were in. The data were then sorted by position, and the analyses
were run with only the after position data. The results of this analysis indicated
that the main effect of objective condition was no longer significant, (F(1, 22) =
2.577, g > .05). The nearly significant main effect for objectives obtained with the
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full sample was therefore probably a chance result, particularly because for half
of the participants, the objective manipulation had not yet been carried out.
Results of the pilot study indicated that the act of generating solutions
under conditions of conflicting objectives and no objectives did not significantly
increase reports of trait anxiety. This allowed the author to place the trait anxiety
measure earlier in time than the problem solving task, without jeopardizing the
integrity of the trait anxiety scores.
Part I of main study. Potential participants were recruited from courses
being held in the summer and fall sessions of 1997. Permission was obtained
from instructors willing to offer course credit for research participation for one or
more researchers to recruit volunteers at the end of their classes. Students were
first given information regarding the nature and purpose of the study. They were
informed that each part of the study would take approximately 30 minutes, and
that Part I of the study could be completed at their convenience. They were also
informed that completion of both parts of the study was required in order to
receive research credit. Volunteers were then asked to sign up for a time that
they could return to the lab for Part II. They were given a packet and instructions
for completing the materials. They were instructed to first read the consent form
and to decide whether they would like to participate. A label on each packet gave
instructions for returning the uncompleted packet to the experimenter if a
participant read the consent form and decided not to participate.
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Part II of main study. Participants were run in small groups of one to eight
individuals, with one to two experimenters present at each session. First,
consent forms were collected from the packets so that participants’ names would
no longer be associated with their data. Participants were then asked to check
the materials in their packets to insure that they responded to all the
questionnaire items. Next, they completed a 12-item demographic scale. The
problem objective manipulation was then carried out. Participants were given a
packet with a cover that had printed instructions. The experimenter instructed
participants to read the instructions as he/she read them aloud. Instructions on
the packet were as follows:
You will now read a problem and generate solutions to it. First, read the
problem presented to you on the laminated card. Next, turn this page and
follow the instructions on the next page. Do not look ahead or back in the
packet. Do not turn any page until you have completed the instructions on
that page. Feel free to re-read the problem as often as you like. List all the
solutions that occur to you, even if you think they are not “good”. Please
do not evaluate your alternatives for their quality. Just concentrate on
identifying as many possible courses of action the person in the problem
could pursue as you can. When you have finished the entire packet, raise
your hand and the experimenter will be right with you.
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The purpose of explicit instructions to refrain from looking ahead or back
in the packet was to preserve the objective manipulation. For example, if
participants in the one-objective-at-a-time condition looked at all four objectives
before generating any alternatives, it would in effect be a conflicting objectives
condition. To further remind participants not to look ahead or back in the packet,
a footer was placed on each page with these instructions:
Do not look ahead or back in the packet.
Finish this page before going on to the next page.
Observation of participants during the experimental sessions confirmed that they
focused on one page at a time. Order of presentation of the objectives in the one
at a time and conflicting conditions was counterbalanced.
The experimenters discretely recorded the start and finish times of the
problem-solving task. After generating alternatives, participants completed a
packet designed to assess their state anxiety. The first page was the state form
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). The second and third
pages consisted of eight questions developed by the experimenter to further
identify participants high in anxiety.
The final measure given in Part II was the vocabulary subscale of the
Multidimensional Aptitude Battery (Jackson, 1984), a battery frequently used for
adolescent and adult populations. The scale consists of 46 items, which the
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respondent has seven minutes to complete. Upon completion of the vocabulary
scale, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Solution Rating Procedure
The procedure used to analyze the qualitative (solution) data included
several steps. The rating procedure will be discussed in the following sequence:
(a) reducing solutions to set of non-repeating solutions, (b) assessing quantity of
solutions, and (c) assessing quality of solutions.
Reducing solutions to set of non-repeating solutions. The purpose of this
process was twofold: (a) to condense the raw set of solution generation data
down to a set of non-repeating solutions (prototypes) suitable for resolving power
rating, and (b) to establish the number of non-repeating solutions generated by
each participant. The original file of raw solution generation data contained over
1,800 “thoughts” recorded by participants. However, these often included the
same thought or solution repeated several times, or thoughts that were deemed
“non-solutions”, such as “Chris is an androgynous name,” or “Dr. Bundt should
not be so hard on Chris.”
Several undergraduate students first transcribed the original set of
thoughts/solutions into a table in Microsoft Word. Most participants had
numbered their thoughts or separated them in some way, so it was possible for
the typists to give each thought its own line in the table. The next step in the
process of moving from raw solution generation data to a set of non-repeating
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solutions suitable for analysis involved the researcher and an undergraduate
student independently identifying “prototypes", or non-repeating solutions.
Prototype was defined for the raters as a solution that is the same in text or
meaning as other solutions.
The task, then, for the raters was to identify solutions that were essentially
the same as other solutions. This task involved reading each “thought or
solution” the participant generated and deciding whether it was a solution, and if
so, whether it had been seen before. A list of prototypes was generated
separately by each rater. If a solution was essentially the same as another
solution, no prototype was added to the list. If it was different from the existing
prototypes, another prototype was added. Often, this decision was easy to make
because the two solutions were word-for-word duplicates. In other cases,
however, the decision involved a subjective judgement. Two solutions were
considered repeating if they met either of the following criteria: (a) the solutions
were the same, but one gave an explanation, such as in, “Quit working for Dr.
Bundt,” versus “Quit working for Dr. Bundt because he’s unappreciative,” or (b)
the meaning of the two solutions was the same, but the wording was different,
such as in “Quit school,” versus “Quit UNO.” Raters were careful not to consider
two solutions as the same just because their category was the same, such as in
“Quit school,” versus “Quit,” versus “Quit research position.” These were all
considered different solutions. Each rater also had a prototype for non-solutions.
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The experimenter identified 650 prototypes, while the undergraduate
researcher identified 260 prototypes. This discrepancy was likely due to the large
number of verbatim solutions (1,844) that had to be condensed. Because this
process had not been used before, the initial listing of prototypes was not as
useful as had been hoped. The experimenter was rigid in deciding whether two
solutions were essentially the same, while the undergraduate rater had a more
lenient view as to what constituted similarity. This discrepancy was resolved by
examining each prototype each rater had listed, discussing the rationale involved
in making the decision to add the prototype, and coming to consensus. The
result of this independent rating and discussion process was a final list of 577
prototypes that both raters agreed were independent and non-repeating. Using
the raters’ judgement and previous work done by Scherer and Billings (1999) for
the research problem, these 577 prototypes were organized into 25 categories.
This list of categories appears in Appendix D.
The next step in preparing the solutions for the rating of resolving power
was to match each verbatim solution to its prototype. The purpose of this step
was to ensure that once the prototypes had been rated, the ratings could
efficiently be transcribed back to the original data set and to individual
participants. The researcher and an undergraduate student independently
assigned a prototype number to each verbatim solution. Discrepancies in
assigning prototypes to solutions were resolved by consensus. Of the 1,844
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original thoughts/solutions, the two raters had initial agreement for 1,423 of the
assignments, or 77%. Consensus was reached by discussion for the remaining
421 solutions.
Assessing quantity of solutions. Quantity of non-repeating solutions was
assessed by counting the number of unique prototypes identified for each
participant.
Assessing quality of solutions. Two graduate students independently rated
the resolving power of each prototype, with disagreements settled through
consensus. The raters received training on how to apply the anchors assigned to
each rating of resolving power to the solutions. The training stressed the
definition of resolving power as the extent to which a solution resolves the
essential conflict of a problem. The essential conflict of the research problem
was defined in prior research as follows: To have a satisfying experience without
sacrificing long-term career opportunities. “Satisfying” was taken to mean
enjoyable, non-stressful, and educational. The resolving power rating scale and
anchors appear in Appendix C.
To obtain ratings of resolving power, two sets of the 577 prototypes were
cut apart and then sorted by category. The categories were rated one-by-one to
make the task more manageable. Raters were instructed to first read through the
prototypes with the resolving power scale in mind. They then mixed up the stack
and independently made a judgement as to whether the prototype seemed to
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attempt to resolve both sides of the conflict. If it did, it was placed in the "4-6”
pile. If it did not, it was placed in the “1-3” pile. The two raters then came to
consensus about this Initial decision for each prototype. The raters agreed
initially on the classification of 491 of the 577 prototypes, or 85%. The raters then
came to agreement on the dichotomous classification of the remaining 86
prototypes.
Next, the raters independently sorted the prototypes within the 1-3 group.
Considering the essential conflict of the problem and the anchors for each rating
of resolving power, they made finer distinctions among the prototypes in the pile,
putting the 1-3 prototypes into 1, 2, and 3 piles. Next, the raters identified the
prototypes for which there was perfect agreement and set those aside.
Consensus was reached for the initial disagreement prototypes by discussing the
rationale each used to make his/her decision. Then the process was repeated
with the 4-6 pile. There was initial agreement between raters on the resolving
power ratings of 388 of the prototypes, or 67%. The two raters then discussed
their disagreements for the remaining 189 prototypes and came to consensus.
The distribution of resolving power ratings for the 577 prototypes appears in
Table 3.
A graphical presentation of the distribution of resolving power ratings, and
the distribution of high and low resolving power ratings, appears in Figures 1 and
2, respectively.
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Table 3
Frequency and Percentage of Solutions Within Each Category of Resolving
Power
Resolving
Power Rating
Frequency of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

TOTAL

126

67

67

121

143

53

577

22%

12%

12%

21%

25%

9%

100%

Note. A rating of 1 is the lowest and a rating of 6 is the highest rating of resolving
power.
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U Frequency of Solutions :

Resolving Power Rating

Figure Caption
Figure 1. Frequency distribution for resolving power ratings among solutions.
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H Frequency of Solutions

Low Resolving Power

High Resolving Power

Figure Caption
Figure 2. Frequency distribution for high and low resolving power ratings among
solutions.
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Results
Overview of Analyses
The study was a 2 x 3 completely randomized design, with trait anxiety
and problem structuring as between-subjects variables. Quantity and quality
(resolving power) of alternatives generated were the dependent variables. The
hypotheses were tested using a regression model. Regression analysis was
chosen for this data because regression allows for continuous variables. Trait
anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983), is
a continuous measure with no pre-defined levels of “high” and “low” trait anxiety.
It was felt that using ANOVA, by making this continuous variable categorical,
could result in some loss of power.
Examination of Demographic Variables
The demographic variables of gender (male, female), race (Caucasian,
non-Caucasian), academic standing (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior,
other/don’t know), and verbal ability were analyzed to examine their possible
impact on the dependent variables. This analysis was important as an
examination of the impact of individual difference variables on anxiety and
problem solving performance.
The regression of the dependent variables on gender and race was
examined. Males and females did not differ significantly on any of the solution
quantity, solution quality, or effort measures. The regression of the measures of
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solution quantity and quality on race revealed no significant effects. The
Caucasian group did not differ significantly from the non-Caucasian group on any
of the solution quantity, solution quality, or effort measures.
The relationship between academic standing and the dependent
measures was assessed using analysis of variance. No significant effects were
found for the solution quantity, solution quality, or effort measures.
Verbal ability (as measured by the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery;
Jackson, 1984) was a significant predictor of quantity of solutions generated
(F(1, 182) = 12.99, g < .01) and number of highly resolving solutions (F(1, 182) =
10.02, p < .01). Males achieved an average verbal ability score significantly
higher than that of females (M = 24.81 for males,

M = 21.51

for females). In

addition, verbal ability was significantly related to academic standing. The senior
group achieved a significantly higher vocabulary test score than the freshman
group, and the other/don’t know group achieved a significantly higher score than
the freshman and sophomore groups. Descriptive statistics for the demographic
variables of gender, race, and academic standing appear in Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Variables
Verbal
Ability

5.51

Minutes
Spent
Problem
Solving
12.17

0.61

5.40

10.33

21.51

3.54

0.61

5.43

10.76

22.87

4.93

3.68

0.61

5.46

11.36

20.88

6.43

4.21

3.71

0.64

5.18

10.21

18.43

36

7.11

4.72

3.69

0.64

5.31

9.97

20.36

Junior

43

8.47

5.21

3.51

0.59

5.49

10.63

22.42

Senior

66

9.88

5.83

3.44

0.58

5.55

11.12

24.06

Other
standing/
don’t know

11

11.45

7.18

3.88

0.68

5.64

15.36

29.36

Group

N

Number
NonRepeating

Number
Highly
Resolving

Average
Resolving
Power

Male

48

9.04

5.42

Female

135

8.41

Caucasian

142

NonCaucasian
Freshman

3.53

Propor
tion
Highly
Resolving
0.61

5.25

3.58

8.70

5.42

42

8.17

28

Sophomore

Highest
Resolving
Solution

24.81

■

Descriptive Statistics for Problem Solving Data
Table 5 presents descriptive data for the distribution of resolving power
ratings among the total number of non-repeating solutions generated. The
distribution of resolving power ratings grouped into “high” resolving power
(solutions rated 4, 5, or 6) and “low” resolving power (solutions rated 1, 2, or 3)
appears in Table 6. A summary of the average quantity and quality of solutions
generated appears in Table 7. Detailed descriptive information for the problem
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solving data can be found in Appendix E (Tables E1 to E14 and Figures E1 to
E3).
Table 5
Distribution of Resolving Power Ratings
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

326

87

188

343

493

141

21%

6%

12%

22%

31%

9%

Note. Total number of solutions = 1578.

Table 6
Distribution of High and Low Resolving Power
Low Resolving Power

High Resolving Power

Number of Solutions

601

977

Percentage of Solutions

38%

62%

Note. Total number of solutions = 1578. Low resolving power = rating of 1, 2, or
3. High resolving power = rating of 4, 5, or 6.
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Table 7
Average Quantity and Quality of Solutions
Number
NonRepeating

Number
Highly
Resolving

Average
Resolving
Power

Proportion
Highly
Resolving

Highest
Resolving
Solution

8.58

5.30

3.59

0.61

5.51

Minutes
Spent
Problem
Solving
10.90

Note. N = 184.
Correlations Among Dependent Variables
Summary statistics for and correlations among all variables are presented
in Table 8. There was a significant, positive correlation between state anxiety
and trait anxiety (r_= .5052, p < .01). Self-reported social problem solving ability
was significantly, negatively correlated with both state and trait anxiety
(r = -.3916, p <. 01; r = -.5848, p < .01, respectively), indicating that elevated
anxiety is associated with poorer self-reported social problem solving ability.
Need for cognition was also significantly, negatively correlated with state and
trait anxiety (r = -.1882, p < .05; r = -.2809, p < .01, respectively).
For the solution generation measures, number of non-repeating solutions
was highly correlated with number of highly resolving solutions (r = .8952, p <
.01), but not with average resolving power of solutions or with proportion of
highly resolving solutions. This finding indicates that though generating a large
number of solutions was associated with a greater number of “good” solutions, it
was also associated with a greater number of “bad” solutions,
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thus reducing the average resolving power and proportion of resolving solutions.
The four operatationalizations of resolving power (number highly resolving,
average resolving power, proportion highly resolving, and highest resolving
solution) were all significantly, positively correlated with each other.
Solution Quantity
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants presented with one objective at a
time would generate more solutions than those presented with conflicting
objectives simultaneously or no objectives. This hypothesis received strong
support. The regression of number of non-repeating solutions on structuring, trait
anxiety, and their interaction was tested. When structuring was entered first, the
multiple correlation value was R = .5420. This value was significant at the .001
level (F(2, 178) = 36.604, p < .001). Variance accounted for was R2 = .2938. This
finding means that 30% of the variance in number of non-repeating solutions can
be accounted for by structuring. The regression analysis revealed that the mean
number of non-repeating solutions generated by participants receiving one
objective at a time was significantly greater
(M = 12.67, SD = 5.36) than the mean number generated by participants
receiving no objectives

(M = 6.27,

SD = 3.09) or conflicting objectives

(M = 7.40,

SD = 4.42). When trait anxiety was added to the regression equation, the change
in variance accounted for was AR2 = .0021 and was not significant (F(2, 178) =
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.5317, £ > .05). The interaction of structuring and trait anxiety was not significant
(F(2, 178) = .6711, £ > .05).
Resolving Power of Solutions
Resolving power was operationalized as (a) the number of highly
resolving solutions, (b) the average resolving power of solutions, (c) the
proportion of highly resolving solutions, and (d) the highest resolving power
rating any solution received.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that individuals high in trait anxiety would generate
solutions lower in resolving power in the no objectives and the conflicting
objectives conditions than individuals low in trait anxiety. Support for this
hypothesis would be represented by a significant interaction between structuring
and trait anxiety. This hypothesis was not supported for any of the
operationalizations of resolving power.
The regression of number of highly resolving solutions on structuring, trait
anxiety, and their interaction was tested. When structuring was entered first, the
multiple correlation value was R = .5214. This value was significant at the .001
level (F(2, 178) = 32.86, £ < .001). Variance accounted for was R2 = .2719. This
finding means that 27% of the variance in number of highly resolving solutions
can be accounted for by structuring. The regression analysis revealed that the
mean number of non-repeating solutions generated by participants receiving one
objective at a time was significantly greater (M = 7.87, SD = 3.67) than the mean

93

number generated by participants receiving no objectives (M = 3.78, SD = 2.37)
or conflicting objectives (M = 4.64, SD = 2.53). When trait anxiety was added to
the regression equation, the change in variance accounted for was AR2 = .0021
and was not significant (F(2, 178) = .6969, p > .05). The interaction of structuring
and trait anxiety was not significant (F(2, 178) = 1.3106, p > .05).
For resolving power operationalized as the average resolving power of
solutions generated, there were no significant main effects, nor was there a
significant interaction between structuring and trait anxiety.
For resolving power operationalized as the proportion of highly resolving
alternatives (proportion receiving a resolving power rating of 4, 5, or 6), there
were no significant main effects, nor was there a significant interaction between
structuring and trait anxiety.
For resolving power operationalized as the highest resolving solution,
there were no significant main effects, nor was there a significant interaction
between structuring and trait anxiety. Nearly every participant had a value of 4,
5, or 6 on this variable, however, resulting in very little variance and violation of
regression assumptions.
Hypothesis 2 was based on the assumption that state anxiety would be
elevated in the conflicting objectives and no objectives conditions for those high
in trait anxiety, as compared to the one-objective-at-a-time condition. ANOVA
%
was used to examine differences in state anxiety level as a function of structuring
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condition. Mean state anxiety level for those high in trait anxiety did not differ
significantly across structuring conditions.
Participants in the present study were not constrained to spend a certain
amount of time on the problem solving task. Participants in the one-objective-ata-time condition spent an average of 14.59 minutes generating solutions, while
participants in the conflicting objectives and no objectives conditions spent an
average of 10.19 minutes and 7.92 minutes, respectively. The amount of time
participants spent generating solutions was significantly, positively correlated
with number of non-repeating solutions (r = .4755,

jd <

.01), number of highly

resolving solutions (r = .5265, £ < .01), and highest resolving solution (r = .2797,
g < .01). This finding indicates that the longer an individual spent thinking about
the problem and generating solutions, the more solutions would be identified, the
more “good” solutions would be identified, and the higher the resolving power of
the highest rated solution would be.
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Discussion
Summary of Results
It was predicted that the way a problem is structured would influence the
quantity and quality of solutions generated to ill-structured problems, and that
trait anxiety would moderate this relationship. Results indicated that problem
structuring does indeed affect the quantity and resolving power of alternatives.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that providing participants with one objective at a time
would lead them to generate a greater number of alternatives than presenting
them with no objectives or with conflicting objectives simultaneously. This
hypothesis was strongly supported. Structuring the problem by considering one
objective at a time led participants to generate nearly twice as many unique
alternatives as those who considered conflicting objectives simultaneously or
those who were provided with no objectives.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that trait anxiety would moderate the relationship
between problem structuring and solution generation. Specifically, it was
predicted that individuals high in trait anxiety would generate solutions lower in
resolving power in the conflicting objectives and no objectives conditions than
those low in trait anxiety. Prior research has shown that impairments in
performance for those high in trait anxiety are generally found only under
conditions of elevated state anxiety (e.g., Zarantonello, Slaymaker, Johnson, &
Petzel, 1984), and/or when the task is difficult or complex (e.g., Spielberger,
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1966). Hypothesis 2 was based on the premise that the task in the no objectives
and conflicting objectives conditions would be more difficult and complex, and
would therefore increase state anxiety for those participants high in trait anxiety.
The difficulty of generating solutions when conflicting objectives are presented
simultaneously may be indicated by the finding in the present study and in prior
research that the presentation of one objective at a time leads to the generation
of more alternatives than the presentation of conflicting objectives
simultaneously.
As noted by Pitz et al. (1980), structuring may improve decision quality by
insuring that all relevant alternatives are considered. It was predicted that the
lack of a helpful structuring aid in the no objectives condition would make the
task more difficult, and therefore elevate state anxiety. Prior research has shown
that presenting individuals with conflicting objectives simultaneously leads them
to generate fewer solutions than presenting them with one objective at a time
(Butler & Scherer, 1997; Scherer & Billings, 1999). This finding can be taken as
evidence that the task of generating solutions is more complex and/or difficult
under the condition of conflicting objectives than under the one-objective-at-atime condition. When presented with conflicting objectives simultaneously,
participants are considering more information about the problem, and the
essential conflict of the problem is made salient. Mayer (1977) found that trait
anxiety is more likely to lead to performance decrements for complex tasks. The
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premise of Hypothesis 2 was that presenting conflicting objectives
simultaneously increases the complexity of the task, beyond that of the oneobjective-at-a-time condition. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants high in trait
anxiety would suffer performance decrements (reductions in resolving power of
solutions) in both the conflicting objectives and no objectives condition, but for
different reasons. Support for this hypothesis would be demonstrated by a
significant interaction between trait anxiety and structuring.
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Examination of state anxiety across
structuring conditions revealed that state anxiety for those high in trait anxiety
was not significantly elevated in the no objectives or conflicting objectives
conditions as compared to the one-objective-at-a-time condition. The means
were in the predicted direction, but differences were not significant. Neither trait
nor state anxiety was correlated with any of the measures of quantity and quality
of solutions, nor was anxiety correlated with time spent generating solutions.
Several other interesting results emerged. One of the measures of
resolving power was the number of highly resolving solutions. Results for this
variable were quite simitar to those obtained with the quantity measure, number
of non-repeating solutions. Participants in the one-objective-at-a-time condition
generated not only more solutions, but more high-quality solutions than those in
either the no objectives or conflicting objectives conditions. In addition, number
of non-repeating or unique solutions was highly correlated with number of highly
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resolving solutions, but not with average resolving power of solutions nor with
proportion of highly resolving solutions. This finding indicates that while
generating a large number of solutions was associated with a large number of
“good” solutions, it also was associated with a large number of “bad” solutions,
thus reducing the average resolving power and proportion of resolving solutions.
Participants in the present study were not constrained to spend a certain
amount of time on the problem solving task. Participants in the one-objective-ata-time condition spent about 15 minutes generating solutions, while participants
in the conflicting objectives and no objectives conditions spent about 10 minutes
and 8 minutes, respectively. The amount of time participants spent generating
solutions was significantly correlated with the quantity and resolving power
(measured by number of highly resolving solutions and highest resolving
solution) of solutions generated. This finding indicates that the longer an
individual spent thinking about the problem and generating solutions, the more
solutions would be identified, the more “good” solutions would be identified, and
the higher the resolving power of the highest rated solution would be. The effort
expended on the task, as measured by time spent, was directly related to
performance.
Interpretation of Findings
A significant interaction between trait anxiety and problem structuring was
predicted by Hypothesis 2, but was not supported for any of the four
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operationalizations of resolving power (number of highly resolving solutions,
average resolving power of solutions, proportion of highly resolving solutions,
highest resolving solution). Anxiety did not influence task performance directly,
nor did it influence performance indirectly via the relationship between effort and
performance. Prior research has shown that impaired problem solving ability in
individuals high in trait anxiety are generally only found under conditions of
elevated state anxiety. It is the researcher’s contention that the failure of high
trait anxiety to induce impairments in resolving power was due to the insignificant
elevations of state anxiety across structuring conditions. The manipulation of
problem structuring was not sufficiently anxiety-provoking to induce deficits in
performance for those high in trait anxiety. In the no objectives condition,
perhaps the underlying conflict of the problem was sufficiently transparent, and
the conflict sufficiently easy to resolve, that not having objectives to structure the
problem was not problematic. In the conflicting objectives condition, participants
generated fewer solutions than in the one objective at a time condition, but they
also spent less time generating solutions. Perhaps if time spent generating
solutions had been held constant, individuals in the conflicting objectives
condition would have had difficulty continuing to think of solutions, their state
anxiety would have been increased, and those also high in trait anxiety would
have generated solutions of lower quality.
Regarding the relationship among effort and quantity and quality of
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solutions, a likely interpretation would be that the problem, although complex and
ill-structured, was only moderately difficult, such that the longer one spends on
the task, the better one performs. If the task had been extremely difficult,
spending more time on the task would not have been associated with better
performance.
Context of Findings
Results of the present study are congruent with results of prior research
for the effects of structuring on the quantity of alternatives generated. Consistent
with Pitz et al. (1980), Scherer and Billings (1999), and Butler and Scherer
(1997), presenting objectives one at a time resulted in the generation of a large
number of alternatives. This finding seems to be robust, and it can be concluded
that if one’s goal is to generate a large number of alternatives to a complex
problem, considering one objective at a time will greatly facilitate the process.
Regarding the effects of structuring on resolving power, the present
results at first seem incongruent with prior research. Scherer and Billings (1999)
found that for the research problem, the average resolving power in the
conflicting objectives condition was higher than that in the one-objective-at-atime condition, and that when the research problem was presented first, the
conflicting objectives condition resulted in more highly resolving alternatives than
any of the other conditions. In addition, the congruent objectives and oneobjective-at-a-time condition resulted in more highly resolving alternatives than
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the no objectives condition. In the present study, using the same problem, no
structuring effects were found for resolving power as the average resolving
power of solutions, the proportion of highly resolving solutions, or the highest
resolving solution. For number of highly resolving solutions, the results indicated
that the one-objective-at-a-time condition resulted in more highly resolving
solutions than the conflicting objectives condition and the no objectives
condition.
Several possible explanations for the differences in findings between the
present study and Scherer and Billings (1999) were explored. In both studies,
participants were undergraduate psychology students, but the studies were
conducted at different universities. Perhaps there is something qualitatively
different about the psychology students at Ohio State University versus the
University of Nebraska at Omaha. The examination of individual difference
variables in the present study revealed an effect of verbal ability on the number
of solutions and the number of highly resolving solutions generated. In the future,
individual differences such as cognitive ability that are likely to influence solution
quantity and quality should be examined. Another possible explanation for the
different findings is the minor differences in measurement of the dependent
variables, in that the Scherer and Billings study rated resolving power on an 8point scale and the present study utilized a 6-point scale.
Perhaps the most interesting explanation for the conflicting effects
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between the present study and Scherer and Billings was that participants in the
Scherer and Billings study were constrained to spend 20 minutes thinking about
the problem and generating solutions, whereas in the present study, time spent
was not controlled. In the present study, time spent was directly related to
problem solving performance. Because time spent on the task was confounded
with structuring, it is not clear whether problem solving performance was due to
the structuring, time spent, or both.
The results of the present study can be interpreted in light of prior
research on anxiety and problem solving, although this literature is vast and the
results often conflicting. Prior research on the effects of state and trait anxiety on
problem solving has generally indicated that high trait anxiety leads to problem
solving impairments under conditions of elevated state anxiety, and/or when the
task is difficult or complex.
In the present study, state anxiety was not significantly elevated, and this
is one possible explanation for the lack of a moderating relationship between trait
anxiety, problem structuring, and the quantity and quality of solutions generated.
Whether or not state anxiety should have been elevated by the conflicting
objectives condition and no objectives condition is a question worth examining.
Riedel et al. (1983) found the performance of a divergent (creative) problem
solving task led to a non-significant increase in state anxiety, compared to a
convergent problem solving task and a control condition. The divergent task in
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this study required participants to identify as many possible uses for thirty
common objects as they could. Perhaps the task of generating as many
solutions as one could for an ill-structured problem is similar in some respect to
the task used by Riedel et al. If the task in the present study could be considered
a creative problem solving task, perhaps increases in state anxiety would not be
expected in any of the structuring conditions. To examine this possibility, the
mean state anxiety score of the present participants (collected immediately after
finishing the problem solving task) was compared to normative data offered by
Spielberger (1983) in the manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The mean
state anxiety score for this males in this sample was at the 36th percentile in the
norms for college students, and for females was at the 44th percentile, indicating
that state anxiety was not elevated in any of the three structuring conditions,
compared to the norm state anxiety score that would typically be found for
college students.
Implications of Findings
The finding that presenting objectives one at a time leads to a large
number of alternatives has been particularly robust. Consistent with prior
research, the present study found that presenting problem solvers with one
objective at a time greatly increases the number of alternatives they generate. As
noted by Pitz et al. (1980), if the goal is to increase problem solving performance
on ill-structured problems, one method is to structure the problem by considering
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one objective at a time.
Problem structuring through the use of objectives affected task
performance not only directly but also through the mechanism of time on task;
spending more time on the task facilitated the generation of more alternatives
overall, and more high quality alternatives. For ill-structured problems that are
less difficult to decompose, getting people to spend more time on the problem
solving task may enhance performance regardless of decision aid utilized. The
author would speculate that decision aids would become more important relative
to time spent on the task for more difficult problems. Thus, in an applied setting,
it seems important to evaluate the complexity and difficulty of the problem. For
easier problems, presenting one-objective-at-a-time would be likely to lead to a
large number of alternatives, and spending longer on the problem solving task
would be likely to lead to a greater number of high quality alternatives. For more
difficult complex problems, structuring the problem using decision aids such as
structuring would be likely to increase the quality of the alternatives.
Two possibilities seem likely as explanations for the results obtained for
anxiety and problem solving: (a) trait anxiety does moderate the relationship
between problem structuring and solution generation, but the task was not
sufficiently state anxiety-provoking to detect this effect, (b) trait anxiety does not
moderate the relationship between structuring and solution generation. Perhaps
the effects of anxiety on performance that have been documented in other

105

domains and with other types of problems operate through other complex
mechanisms involving person and situational variables.
Limitations
One limitation of the present study is that the difficulty of the problem
solving task was not assessed. Hypothesis 2 was based on the premise that the
task in the no objectives condition and the conflicting objectives condition would
be more difficult or complex than the task in the one-objective-at-a-time
condition, and thus would elevate state anxiety for those high in trait anxiety.
This state anxiety elevation was expected to impair problem solving
performance. The lack of data on the difficulty of the task in the various
structuring conditions prevents a definitive interpretation of the results found for
Hypothesis 2. It is possible that the presentation of conflicting objectives or no
objectives did not increase the difficulty of the task compared to the presentation
of one objective at a time, but it is also possible that difficult tasks do not elevate
state anxiety. It has been unclear in some studies of anxiety whether
performance decrements are due to the difficulty of the task, the elevation of
state anxiety, or both. Measuring the difficulty of the task in each structuring
condition would have aided in clarifying the relationship between task difficulty,
anxiety, and problem solving.
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Future Directions
The present study is part of a program of research examining the
variables affecting solution generation. This study extends the research on
anxiety and problem solving in that it examined a truly real-world problem. The
researcher’s contention is that prior research on the relationship between anxiety
and problem solving failed to replicate the complexity of real-world problems (i.e.,
the problems used were difficult or complex, but still had one correct answer,
such as anagrams). Future research should continue to examine problem solving
as it exists in the real world, as this will increase the generalizability of problem
solving research. The continued use of ill-structured, complex problems in
research will contribute to the validity of recommendations made regarding how
to increase the quality of solutions generated for problems in the work place.
Drawing conclusions regarding the effects of anxiety on the quantity and
quality of solutions generated for ill-structured problems seems premature. The
development of a generally agreed-upon definition and theory of anxiety, and
further research on anxiety using ill-structured, real world problems, would
facilitate the drawing of conclusions, and allow for recommendations to be made
regarding whether anxiety should be reduced or controlled in order to improve an
individual’s problem solving performance.
Though not the focus of the present investigation, two individual
difference measures of problem solving merit further study. Specifically, social
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problem solving, which taps into a person’s ability to solve problems, and need
for cognition, an index of a person’s motivation to solve problems, both were
correlated with solution generation effectiveness. It was found in the present
study that self-reported social problem solving ability was highly correlated with
the effort expended in generating solutions (as measured by time spent), and
that both social problem solving and need for cognition were positively correlated
with the quantity and quality of solutions generated, and negatively correlated
with both state and trait anxiety. Prior research in the area of social problem
solving (Nezu, 1985) has indicated that self-reported ineffective problem solvers
experience higher state and trait anxiety, report more frequent current problems
and are more distressed by these problems, than self-reported effective problem
solvers. Future research should be focused on these as well as other individual
differences that may account for differences in problem solving success.
The finding that effort expended (time spent) on generating solutions was
directly related to the quantity of solutions generated points to the likelihood that
the problem, while ill-structured and complex, was rather easy. These findings
should be replicated with more difficult, ill-structured problems.
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Appendix A
Stimulus Materials
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Chris’s Problem
In order to increase available job opportunities upon graduation, Chris
decided to work as a research assistant with a faculty member in the psychology
department during junior and senior year. Chris was not sure who to work with.
The head of the department, Dr. Johnson, suggested that Chris work with his
good friend, Dr. Bundt, since Dr. Bundt is well known in his field, has good job
contacts, and has many other students working with him. After working with Dr.
Bundt for two months, Chris has realized that the job is not very enjoyable. The
other students working with Dr. Bundt appear to be very happy, but Chris is not
interested in the research project that the students were assigned to work on. In
addition, Chris finds that the job requires a lot of work to do that is very time
consuming, with very little guidance provided on how to do what is required. Dr.
Bundt himself turns out to be unfriendly and difficult to please. Chris is not sure
what to do.
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Instructions to Participants
You will be participating in a study examining solutions generated to
complex problems. On the following pages, you will find a problem, some
instructions for generating solutions, and a questionnaire for you to complete.
Please take your time when generating solutions and consider each question
carefully in the questionnaire. When you have finished generating solutions and
responding to the questionnaire, please turn all materials in to the experimenter.
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Objectives for Chris’s Problem
(Scherer & Billings, 1999)
1.

To avoid excessive demands

2.

To acquire a good reputation among faculty

3.

To minimize inconvenience

4.

To increase job opportunities

One-Objective-at-a-Time
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An objective Chris is concerned with is:
To increase job opportunities
Please list all the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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Another objective Chris is concerned with is:
To avoid excessive demands
Please list all the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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Another objective Chris is concerned with is:
To acquire a good reputation among faculty
Please list all the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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Another objective Chris is concerned with is:
To minimize inconvenience
Please list all the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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Conflicting Objectives
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Two objectives Chris is concerned with are:
To avoid excessive demands
To acquire a good reputation among faculty
Please list ail the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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Two objectives Chris is concerned with are:
To increase job opportunities
To minimize inconvenience
Please list all the alternatives you can think of in the space below.
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No Objectives

127

Please list all the alternatives which occur to you in the space below.
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Debriefing
The purpose of the experiment was to see if giving people objectives to
consider when solving a problem leads them to come up with more and/or better
solutions. We also wanted to see if certain personality characteristics, such as
the tendency to be calm or nervous, affect people’s ability to solve problems
effectively. If you would like more information about this study or if you would like
to know the results when it is completed, you may contact the experimenter,
Judy Wightman, at 554-4811, or 592-5993. You may also contact Dr. Lisa
Scherer, at 554-2698. We ask that you please do not disclose the nature of this
experiment to others because it can bias our results if participants know what to
expect when they arrive.

129

Appendix B
Measures
(STAI-Trait; Spielberger, 1983)
Self-Evaluation Questionnaire
Directions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are
given below. Read each statement and then use your answer sheet to indicate
how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too
much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe
how you generally feel.
1.

I feel pleasant.

2.

I feel nervous and restless.

3.

I feel satisfied with myself.

4.

I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be.

5.

I feel like a failure.

6.

I feel rested.

7.

I am “calm, cool, and collected.”

8.

I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them

9.

I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter.

10.

I am happy.

11.

I have disturbing thoughts.

130

12.

I lack self-confidence.

13.

I feel secure.

14.

I make decisions easily.

15.

I feel inadequate.

16.

I am content.

17.

Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me.

18.

I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind.

19.

I am a steady person.

20.

I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and
interests.

Note. Participants responded using a four-point scale. 1 = Almost Never, 2 =
Sometimes, 3 = Often, 4 = Almost Always.

131

(STAI-State; Spielberger, 1983)
Self-Evaluation Questionnaire
Directions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are
given below. Read each statement and respond on your answer sheet to
indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or
wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
1.

I feel calm.

2.

I feel secure.

3.

I am tense.

4.

I feel strained.

5.

I feel at ease.

6.

I feel upset.

7.

I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes

8.

I feel satisfied.

9.

I feel frightened.

10.

I feel comfortable.

11.

I feel self-confident.

12.

I feel nervous.

13.

I am jittery.
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14.

I feel indecisive.

15.

I am relaxed.

16.

I feel content.

17.

I am worried.

18.

I feel confused.

19.

I feel steady.

20.

I feel pleasant.

Note. Participants responded using a four-point scale
Somewhat, 3 = Moderately So, 4 = Very Much So.
(Additional Questions)
21.

Rate the extent to which being an experimental participant in general
makes you feel anxious or nervous. Choose the number that corresponds
to how anxious or nervous you generally feel in this situation and mark it
on your answer sheet.

22.

1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A Little

Moderately

Very Much

Extremely

Rate the extent to which the previous task made you feel fearful. Choose
the number that corresponds to how fearful the task made you feel and
mark it on your answer sheet.
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A Little

Moderately

Very Much

Extremely
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23.

Rate the extent to which the previous task made you feel anxious or
nervous. Choose the number that corresponds to how anxious or
nervous the task made you feel and mark it on your answer sheet.
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

A Little

Moderately

Very Much

Extremely

Please respond to the following items on your answer sheet using this scale:
1

Yes

2

No

24.

Do you or did you have any exams today?

25.

Is there anything going on in your life right now that is making you feel
particularly anxious or nervous?

26.

Is there any event that you are very worried about right now?

27.

Do you have any papers or major projects due anytime in the next 3
days?

28.

If so, are you finished with the paper or project?
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(Need for Cognition Scale; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement
is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not
at all like you) please mark a "1” on your answer sheet; if the statement is
extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please mark a “5” on your
answer sheet.

You should use the following scale as yourate each of the

statements below.
1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic
3

Uncertain

4

Somewhat Characteristic

5

Extremely Characteristic

1.

I prefer complex to simple problems.

2.

I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation thatrequires a

lot of

thinking.
3.

Thinking is not my idea of fun.

4.

I would rather do something that requires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.

5.

I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely
have to think in depth about something.

6.

I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.

chance I will
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7.

I only think as hard as I have to.

8.

I prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones.

9.

I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.

10.

The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

11.

I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to
problems.

12.

Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me much.

13.

I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.

14.

The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

15.

I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that
is somewhat important but does not require much thought.

16.

I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a
lot of mental effort.

17.

It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or
why it works.

18.

I usually end up deliberating about issues even when theydo not affect
me personally.
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(Social Problem Solving Scale; variation of
Social Problem-Solving Inventory, D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990)
Instructions
Below are some statements that describe how some people might think, feel,
and act when faced with important PROBLEMS in everyday living. W e are not
talking about the ordinary hassles and pressures that you deal with successfully
every day. In this questionnaire, a problem is something important in your life
that bothers you a lot but you don’t immediately know how to make it better or
stop it from bothering you so much. You know that you have a problem when
you feel confused, uncertain, puzzled, or stumped about something. The
problem could be something about yourself (e.g., family, friends, co-workers,
employer), or your physical environment and possessions (e.g., your house, car,
property, money). Read each statement carefully and select one of the numbers
below that indicates how true the statement is of you. Consider yourself as you
typically think, feel, and act when you are faced with important problems these
days. Mark the number that you choose on your answer sheet.
1 = Not at all true of me
2 = Slightly true of me
3 = Moderately true of me
4 = Very true of me
5 = Extremely true of me
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1.

I spend too much time worrying about my problems instead of trying to solve
them.

2.

I feel threatened and afraid when I have an important problem to solve.

3.

When making decisions, I do not evaluate all my options carefully enough.

4.

When I have a decision to make, I often fail to consider the effects that each
option is likely to have on the well-being of other people.

5.

When I am trying to solve a problem, I often think of different solutions and
then try to combine them to make a better solution.

6.

I feel nervous and unsure of myself when I have an important decision to
make.

7.

When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I know if I persist and do not
give up too easily, I will be able to find a good solution eventually.

8.

When I am attempting to solve a problem, I usually act on the first idea that
occurs to me.

9.

Whenever I have a problem, I usually believe that it can be solved.

10. I usually wait to see if a problem will resolve itself first, before trying to solve
it myself.
11. When I have a problem to solve, one of the things I do is analyze the
situation and try to identify what obstacles are keeping me from getting what
I want.
12. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get frustrated.
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13.

When I am faced with a difficult problem, I often doubt that I will be able to
solve it on my own no matter how hard I try.

14. When a problem occurs in my life, I usually put off trying to solve it for as
long as possible.
15. After carrying out a solution to a problem, I do not take the time to evaluate
all of the results carefully.
16. I go out of my way to avoid having to deal with problems in my life.
17.

Difficultproblems make me very upset.

18.

When Ihave a decision to make, I try to predict the positive and negative
consequences of each option.

19. When problems occur in my life, I like to deal with them as soon as possible.
20. When I am attempting to solve a problem, I often try to be creative and think
of new or original solutions.
21. When I am trying to solve a problem, I usually go with the first good idea
that comes to mind.
22. When I try to think of different possible solutions to a problem, I cannot
usually come up with many ideas.
23. I prefer to avoid thinking about the problems in my life instead of trying to
solve them.
24. When making decisions, I usually consider both the immediate
consequences and the long-term consequences of each option.
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25. After carrying out my solution to a problem, I try to analyze what went right
and what went wrong.
26. After carrying out my solution to a problem, I examine my feelings and
evaluate how much they have changed for the better.
27.

Before carrying out my solution to a problem, I often practice the solution in
order to increase my chances of success.

28. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I believe I will be able to solve it on
my own if I try hard enough.
29. When I have a problem to solve, one of the first things I do is get as many
facts about the problem as possible.
30. I often put off solving problems until it is too late to do anything about them.
31. I spend more time avoiding my problems than solving them.
32. When I am trying to solve a problem, I often get so upset that I cannot think
clearly.
33.

Before I try tosolve a problem, I usually set a specific goalso that I know
exactly what I want to accomplish.

34. When I have a decision to make, I do not take the time to consider the pros
and cons of each option.
35. When the outcome of my solution to a problem is not satisfactory, I try to
find out what went wrong and then I try again.
36. I hate having to solve the problems that occur in my life.
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37. After carrying out my solution to a problem, I try to evaluate as carefully as
possible how much the situation has changed for the better.
38. When I have a problem, I try to see it as a challenge, or opportunity to
benefit in some positive way from having the problem.
39. When I am trying to solve a problem, I think of as many options as possible
until I cannot come up with any more ideas.
40. When I have a decision to make, I weigh the consequences of each option
and compare them against each other.
41. I often become depressed and immobilized when I have an important
problem to solve.
42. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I usually go to someone else for
help in solving it.
43. When I have a decision to make, I consider the effects that each option is
likely to have on my personal feelings.
44. When I have a problem to solve, one of the things I do is examine what
factors or circumstances in my environment might be contributing to the
problem.
45. When making decisions, I usually go with my “gut feeling” without thinking
too much about the consequences of each option.
46. When making decisions, I generally use a systematic method forjudging
and comparing alternatives.
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47. When I am trying to solve a problem, I keep in mind what my goal is at all
times.
48. When I am attempting to solve a problem, I try to approach it from as many
different angles as possible.
49. When I am having trouble understanding a problem, I try to get more
specific and concrete information about the problem to help clarify it.
50. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I get discouraged and
depressed.
51. When a solution that I have carried out does not solve my problem
satisfactorily, I do not take the time to examine carefully why it did not work.
52. I am too impulsive when it comes to making decisions.
(Additional Questions)
53. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to generate solutions that
address the underlying conflict of the problem.
54. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to generate solutions that
are practical.
55. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to generate solutions that
satisfy the objective that is most important to me.
56. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to generate solutions that
satisfy multiple objectives or goals.
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57. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to think of solutions that
represent compromises among the people involved in the problem.
58. When I am generating solutions to a problem, I try to generate solutions that
resolve the conflicting aspects of the problem.
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Demographic Questionnaire
For the following questions, please fill in the numbered circle on the answer
sheet that corresponds to your answers below.
1.

What is your gender?

1

Male

2

Female

2.

What is your race?

1

Caucasian

4

Asian

2

African American

5

Other

3

Hispanic

3.

4.

What is your highest level of educational experience?
1

High School Graduate

2

Certificate or Dual Certificate

3

Associate’s or Dual Associate’s Degree

4

Some College

5

Bachelor’s Degree

How many semesters have you been enrolled in at least one college
course?

5.

1

1 - 2 semesters

3

7 - 1 0 semesters

2

3 - 6 semesters

4

more than 10 semesters

Which of the following best describes your academic standing?
1

Freshman

3

Junior

2

Sophomore

4

Senior

5

Other/Don’t know
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6.

7.

How many college courses have you taken?
1

0 - 7 courses

4

22 - 29 courses

2

8 - 1 4 courses

5

30 or more courses

3

1 5 - 2 1 courses

How many psychology courses have you taken?
1

1 - 2 courses

4

7 - 9 courses

2

3 - 4 courses

5

10 or more courses

3

5 - 6 courses

8.

Is English your primary language?

1

Yes

9.

Which number below best represents your difficulty in reading English?
1

None

4

Quite a bit

2

Very little

5

Lots

3

Some

2

No

10.

Are you currently employed?

1

Yes

2

No

11.

Are you married?

1

Yes

2

No

12.

Do you have children?

1

Yes

2

No
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(Jackson, 1984)
Multidimensional Aptitude Battery
Vocabulary
This is a test of how many words you know. On your answer sheet, mark the one
alternative that is nearest in meaning to the word given. You will have seven
minutes.
Here are two examples:

quick
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

fast
slow
walk
lethal
run

fast is correct, so A should be marked.

crave
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

destroy
insane
desire
short
bend

desire is the correct answer, so C should be marked.
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1.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

attempt
try
succeed
obtain
do
fail

8.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

equip
hurry
train a horse
same weight
blend
furnish

15.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

autonomy
control by self
governmental system
oppression
car monopoly
anarchy

2.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

mumble
mutter
complain
confuse
blunder
gossip

9.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

mesmerize
polymerize
massage
masticate
hypnotize
pollute

16.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

apathetic
callous
impulsive
hateful
meandering
uninterested

3.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

illusion
literary reference
originality
misleading image
idea
information

10.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

gaudy
showy
religious
messy
windy
lonely

17.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

maelstrom
stateliness
conductor
suit of armor
turmoil
admiration

4.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

symbol
attitude
failure
importance
academy
representation

11.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

protocol
modesty
sapience
diplomatic etiquette
national security
plant or animal tissue

18.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

implicate
involve
extract
penetrate
conclude
reveal

5.

focus
blaze
ending
center
urgency
series

12.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

succumb
aid
follow
yield
obstruct
ponder

19.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

6.

budget
public records
bank account
calendar

etymology
study of the history of words

study of birds
comparative study of chemicals

knowledge of cause or origin

awkward phrasing

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

13.
A.
B.
C.
plan of systematic spending D.
movable
E.

transient
permanent
secret
disguised
passing
ungrateful

20.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

feign
pretend
diminish
prefer
designate
vanish

7.
A.
B
C.
D.
E.

wharf
weak
dock
fishing boat
fishnet
meal

degrade
argue
falsify
classify
debase
slope downward

21.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

juxtapose
place above
move in a circle
place under
place side by side
move away from

14.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

GO TO NEXT PAGE
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22.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

acclaim
affect
blame
attract
demand as right
hail loudly

29.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

austere
soft
kind
heavy
severe
solid

36.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

exonerate
exhibit
acquit
atone
exult
refute
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A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

voracious
destructive
truthful
affluent
beguiling
ravenous

30.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

vigilant
selective
watchful
consistent
hostile
hard-working

37.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

exacerbate
generalize
make more severe
select
praise highly
frustrate

24.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

deity
rule
decision
god
obligation
event

31.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

vacillate
purify
fluctuate
lubricate
immunize
endure

38.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

assiduous
accepting
simple
obstinate
diligent
hostile

25.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

anachronism
recognition
aphorism
misplaced in time
bitter attack
misnomer

32.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

augment
signify
oppose
adapt
believe
increase

39.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

phlegmatic
anxious
bilious
lethargic
anemic
criminal

26.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

effrontery
prominence
insensibility
impudence
radiation
confrontation

33.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

epitome
typical representation
abuse
tomb inscription
long novel
lowest point

40.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

erudite
diseased
hopeful
simplifying
punishing
scholarly

27.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

facade
front
barricade
ornament
center
cover

34.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

accrue
accumulate
decide
disagree
attribute
regret

41.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

prestidigitation
sleight of hand
high reputation
digital computer
walking on the toes
dressed up

28.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

spindle
wheel
shaft
hinge
sword
ball

35.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

rejoinder
appendix
reply
disagreement
removal
commencement

42.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

insipid
treacherous
enduring
poisonous
fearless
dull
GO TO NEXT PAGE
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43.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

antediluvian
rebellious
evil
honorable
antiquated
futuristic

45.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

surreptitious
forceful
ambitious
delicious
cautious
clandestine

44.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

germane
supple
pertinent
ominous
revealing
persuasive

46.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

hirsute
lame
malefic
obtected
hairy
rangy
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Appendix C
Rating Scale for Resolving Power
1

Solution doesn’t do a very good job addressing any aspects/facets of the
problem.

2

Solution addresses one aspect/facet of the problem moderately well.

3

Solution effectively addresses one aspect/facet of the problem.

4

Solution seems to attempt to address the conflicting aspects/facets of the
problem.

5

Solution resolves the conflicting aspects/facets of the problem moderately
well. (Another way to say this is “Incomplete resolution of both sides of the
conflict.”)

6

Solution does a very good job resolving the conflicting aspects/facets of
the problem. (Another way to say this is “Complete resolution within the
universe of solutions you have.”)
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Appendix D
Categories of Prototypes
1.

Talk to Dr. Johnson

2.

Talk to faculty not directly involved

3.

Do another project

4.

Quit

5.

Consult third party for advice (other than Dr. Bundt or Dr. Johnson)

6.

Carefully make a decision based on what’s most important to you

7.

Altering the work assignment or effort (whether good or bad)

8.

Get someone to help (not talking)

9.

Endure situation

10. Talk to Dr. Bundt about time problem
11. Make efficient use of time
12. Avoid Dr. Bundt
13. Don’t worry about faculty
14. Think about situation or change perspective and attitude
15. Talk to Dr. Bundt about problems (not involving time)
16. Talk to multiple people
17. Involve Dr. Bundt and/or Dr. Johnson in career search and job decisions
18. Try to understand and get along with Dr. Bundt
19. Multiple action solutions
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20. Ambiguous solutions
21. Miscellaneous solutions
22. Go outside university for experience or job searching
23. Organizing work
24. Alter coursework or major
25. If/then or contingency solutions
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Appendix E
Descriptive Statistics for Problem Solving Data
Table E1
Distribution of Resolving Power for No Objectives Condition
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

97

9

42

71

125

32

26%

2%

11%

19%

33%

9%

Note. N = 61. Total number of solutions = 376.

Table E2
Distribution of Resolving Power for One-Objective-at-a-Time Condition
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

148

52

94

176

240

63

19%

7%

12%

23%

31%

8%

Note. N = 61. Total number of solutions = 773.
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Table E3
Distribution of Resolving Power for Conflicting Objectives Condition
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

81

26

52

96

128

46

19%

6%

12%

22%

30%

11%

Note. N = 62. Total number of solutions = 429.

Table E4
Distribution of Resolving Power for Low Trait Anxiety
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

174

50

100

182

280

83

20%

6%

12%

21%

32%

10%

Note. N = 91. Total number of solutions = 869.
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Table E5
Distribution of Resolving Power for High Trait Anxiety
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

152

37

88

161

213

58

21%

5%

12%

23%

30%

8%

Note. N = 93. Total number of solutions = 709.

Table E6
Distribution of Resolving Power for Low Trait Anxiety with No Objectives
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

48

3

18

32

61

19

27%

2%

10%

18%

34%

10%

Note. N = 26. Total number of solutions = 1 8 1 .

155

Table E7
Distribution of Resolving Power for Low Trait Anxiety with One Objective at a
Time
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6‘

85

36

58

106

168

42

17%

7%

12%

21%

34%

8%

Note. N = 38. Total number of solutions = 495.

Table E8
Distribution of Resolving Power for Low Trait Anxiety with Conflicting Objectives
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

41

11

24

44

51

22

21%

6%

12%

23%

26%

11%

Note. N = 27. Total number of solutions = 193.
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Table E9
Distribution of Resolving Power for High Trait Anxiety with No Objectives
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

49

6

24

39

64

13

25%

3%

12%

20%

33%

7%

Note. N = 35. Total number of solutions = 195.

Table E10
Distribution of Resolving Power for High Trait Anxiety with One Objective at a
Time
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

63

16

36

70

72

21

23%

6%

13%

25%

26%

8%

Note. N = 23. Total number of solutions = 278.
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Table E11
Distribution of Resolving Power for High Trait Anxiety with Conflicting Objectives
Resolving
Power Rating
Number of
Solutions
Percentage of
Solutions

1

2

3

4

5

6

40

15

28

52

77

24

17%

6%

12%

22%

33%

10%

Note. N = 35. Total number of solutions = 236.

Table E12
Descriptive Statistics for Problem Solving Data by Structuring Condition
Condition

N

Number
of
Solutions

Number
Highly
Resolving

Average
Resolving
Power

No
Objectives
One
Objective
at a Time
Conflicting
Objectives

61

6.16

3.72

61

12.67

62

6.92

Highest
Resolving
Solution

3.55

Propor
tion
Highly
Resolving
0.60

5.36

Minutes
Spent
Problem
Solving
7.92

7.87

3.66

0.63

5.62

14.59

4.34

3.56

0.60

5.55

10.19
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□ Number of Solutions
□ Proportion Highly Resolving

No Objectives

□ Number Highly Resolving
n Highest Resolving Solution

One Objective at a Time

g Average Resolving Power
g Minutes Spent Problem Solving

Conflicting Objectives

Figure Caption
Figure E1. Descriptive statistics for problem solving data by structuring condition.
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Table E13
Descriptive Statistics for Problem Solving Data by Trait Anxiety Condition
Condition

N

Number
of
Solutions

Number
Highly
Resolving

Average
Resolving
Power

Low Trait
Anxiety
High Trait
Anxiety

91

9.55

5.98

93

7.62

4.65

Highest
Resolving
Solution

3.67

Propor
tion
Highly
Resolving
0.63

5.61

Minutes
Spent
Problem
Solving
11.67

3.51

0.60

5.39

10.14
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U Number of Solutions
□ Proportion Highly Resolving

□ Number Highly Resolving
□ Highest Resolving Solution

Low Trait Anxiety

H Average Resolving Power
^Minutes Spent Problem Solving

High Trait Anxiety

Figure Caption
Figure E2. Descriptive statistics for problem solving data by trait anxiety
condition.
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Table E14
Descriptive Statistics for Problem Solving Data by Structuring and Trait Anxiety
Condition
Cell

N

Number of
Solutions

Number
Highly
Resolving

Average
Resolving
Power

Propor
tion Highly
Resolving

Highest
Resolving
Solution

1

26

6.96

4.31

3.47
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Figure E3. Descriptive statistics for problem solving data by structuring and trait anxiety condition.
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